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Abuse of Rights:
The Continental Drug and the Common Law
ANNA DI ROBILANT*
This Article deploys a comparative approach to question a widely shared
understanding of the impact and significance of abuse of rights. First, it challenges the
idea that abuse of rights is a peculiarly civilian "invention," absent in the common law.
Drawing on an influential strand offunctionalist comparative law, the Article identifies
the "functional equivalents of the doctrine in the variety of malice rules and
reasonableness tests deployed by American courts in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century in fields as diverse as water law, nuisance, tortious interference with
contractual relations, and labor law. The Article investigates the reasons why in the
United States, contrary to continental systems where rules limiting a malicious or
unreasonable use of one's right coalesced into a unitary category of "abuse of rights,"
these rules remained largely nonintegrated. Rationalization of these nonintegrated
reasonableness tests and malice rules, I argue, was achieved by means of a novel,
unitary style of reasoning, hardly fitting the traditional portrait of nineteenth-century
"Classical" orthodoxy, rather than by means of conceptual integration. Further, the
Article suggests that abuse of rights' potential as a tool for social reform was
consistently defused. In the United States, rarely and timidly did courts deploy malice
rules to effect progressive distributive outcomes. And even when they did, they
invariably resorted to the individualistic language of modern private law
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[I]t is clear that the theories of abuse and of relativity of rights, in
general, have no place in our law as it now stands.
... The conversations which I have had with continental lawyers
have left me with the impression that 'abus de droit' is regarded as a
dangerous expedient, which should only be utilized to prevent manifest
injustice.
[Abuse of rights] resembles a drug which at first appears to be
innocuous, but may be followed by very disagreeable after effects. Like
all indefinite expressions of an ethical principle it is capable of being
put to an infinite variety of uses, and it may be employed to invade
almost any sphere of human activity for the purpose of subordinating
the individual to the demands of the State.
-H. C. Gutteridge'
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores a crucial, though often neglected, episode in
the history of modern private law: the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century debate over the concept of "abuse of rights." In broad terms, the
i. H. C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights. 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22,.3o, 43-44 (x933) (footnote omitted).
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concept involves an abusive exercise of an otherwise lawful right. The
concept was applied in a variety of subfields of private law including
property, contract, and labor law. It was conceived as a response to the
urgent legal questions posed by the rise of modern industrial society: the
limits of workers' right to strike, the limits of industrial enterprises'
property rights on land vis a vis the rights of their residential neighbors,
and the limits of a landowner's property right to crucial economic
resources, such as water or coal land. This Article uses a comparative
analysis of European and American cases and legal writing to explore a
widely shared understanding of the impact and significance of abuse of
rights, neatly articulated in H. C. Gutteridge's passage. First, it challenges
the notion that abuse of rights is a peculiar "invention" of civil law jurists
that was absent in the common law. Second, it questions the idea that
abuse of rights operated as an effective social "corrective," preventing
the "manifest injustices" allowed by modern individualist private law.
More broadly, this Article touches upon a number of critical debates
in comparative law and legal historiography. It investigates the
relationship between law and social change, between the conceptual
constraints and potentialities of legal doctrine and private lawyers'
aspirations to social reform. Moreover, it attempts a comparative inquiry
into styles of judicial reasoning, inviting further reflection on the
coexistence of "deductive" and "instrumental" modes of justification in
American, as well as in continental European, late-nineteenth-century
cases. Further, the Article draws upon and revisits the "functionalist"
method of comparative legal analysis, arguing for the enduring relevance
of a "textured functionalism." Finally, the story of abuse of rights speaks
to the critical issues faced by contemporary private lawyers: the nature
and the role of private law in the era of the crisis of traditional social
democracy and the need for new legal tools that will broaden the
conversation about the future of our socioeconomic institutions.
Abuse of rights was a most typical "invention" of the wave of social
legal thought that developed in France and Germany starting in the mid-
nineteenth century.2 Swift technological progress, change in the industrial
structure-notably the shift from small, artisanal producing units to large
scale enterprises-and the consequent outburst of social unrest and class
antagonism brought to the forefront the question of the terms of liberty
in new social and economic conditions. Confronted with the need to
foster freedom of enterprise and economic development while limiting
their social repercussions, "social jurists" revolted against "classical"
2. See Marie-Claire Belleau, The " Juristes Inquiets": Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early
Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 387; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of
Law and Legal Thought 1850-2000, in THE NEw LAW AND EcoNOMic DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
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modern private law.3 The social jurists deemed the formalistic and
deductive mode of reasoning relied upon by classical "civilistes," as well
as their individualistic assumptions, inadequate to accommodate
economic change and social cohesion, freedom of action, and security.4 In
contrast, the social jurists called for a sociological and organicistic mode
of reasoning that took into account the purpose of legal rules and the
complexity of "social mechanics."5  At the substantive level, they
advocated complementing "individual law," (i.e., law that regulates
conflicts among individuals) by delimiting their respective rights with a
"social law" (i.e., law that favors social cohesion and privileges collective
interests).6
The doctrine of "abuse of rights" reflected both the yearning for a
new style of legal reasoning and the call for social solidarity. The concept
of "subjective right," elaborated over the centuries by continental legal
science and defined by German Pandectist Bernhard Windscheid as the
3. See Kennedy, supra note 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaak Husik trans., 1913). In Law as a
Means to an End, Jhering furnishes both a critique of conceptual formalism and a purposive definition
of law. Jhering's "naturalist" conception of law reveals the illusionary nature of the grandiose
formalist conceptual architecture, bringing to light the reality of "social mechanics." See generally id. at
71-176. The formalist image of law as clockwork that runs its regulated course into which no
disturbing hand enters is contrasted with the image of law as a "mighty machine" in which
[t]housands of rollers, wheels, knives ... move restlessly, some in one direction, some in
another, apparently quite independent of one another as if they existed only for themselves,
nay in apparent conflict, as if they wanted mutually to annihilate each other-and yet all
work together harmoniously for one purpose, and one single plan rules the whole.
Id. at 71-72. The force that moves the wheelwork is the "will of thousands and millions of individuals,
the struggle of interests, of the opposition of efforts, egoism, self will." Id. at 72. Purpose is the moving
force behind law; "everything found on the ground of law was called into life by a purpose and exists
to realize some purpose." Id. at 330.
6. GEORGES GURVITCH, L'IDEE Du DRorr SOCIAL: NOTION ET SYSTEME Du DROIT SOCIAL (Scientia
Verlag 1972) (1932). Also see GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 166-67 (John Rex ed.,
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1973) (1947) for a later formulation of the idea of "Social Law":
First we observe the contrast between social law and individual law (or better, inter-
individual law), corresponding to the contrast between sociality by interpenetration and
sociality by interdependence (intuitive union and communication by signs). "Social Law" is
a law of objective integration in the "We," in the immanent whole. It permits the subjects,
to whom it is addressed, to participate directly in the whole, which in turn effectively
participates in jural relations. That is why social law is based on confidence, while individual
law, i.e., inter-individual and inter-groupal law, is based distrust. One is the law of peace,
mutual aid, common tasks, the other the law of war, conflicts, separation. For even when
individual law partly draws together subjects as in the case of contracts, it simultaneously
separates them and delimits their interests. All law being a linking of the claims of some
with the duties of others, an "imperative-attributive regulation," in social law claims and
duties interpenetrate each other and form an indissoluble whole, while in individual law




sphere of the individual's absolute and unlimited will,7 appeared to social
jurists as formalistic and unworkable. Rapidly changing socio-economic
conditions demanded a conceptual tool that would account for the
relative and relational nature of "subjective rights." Abuse of rights was
thought to be this tool. It allowed a purposive analysis of competing
rights in light of larger social interests, and it promised to deliver
distributively fair outcomes.
Conceptually, the doctrine was variously articulated; while
subjective formulations focus on the right holder's motive or intent,
objective formulations scrutinize the right holder's conduct. Thus,
different formulations of the doctrine may be arranged along a spectrum
that runs from subjective to objective, each potentially entailing a
different degree of limitation on the right. In a first formulation, located
at the subjective end of the spectrum and known as "aemulatio," the
right holder is said to abuse her right when her exercise of the right is
driven by the sole malicious intent to harm another. The classical
textbook example of the landowner who erects a tall fence for the sole
malicious purpose of depriving her neighbor of light illustrates this
narrow subjective formulation of the theory.
In a second formulation, an abuse of a right has occurred any time
malice is the dominant, though not the exclusive, factor motivating the
actions of the right holder. For instance, in the previous example, while
the fence also serves the purpose of holding ornamental vines, the
landowner would have never erected it if not moved by ill will towards
her neighbor.
According to a third formulation, a subject is deemed to abuse her
right when acting with a lack of "legitimate interest," though not
necessarily spitefully. In late-nineteenth-century developing economies,
the landowner who pumped from her land the groundwater feeding her
neighbor's mill only to end up wasting it was often found to have abused
her right. Although this formulation centers on the subject's motive, it
entails a dose of objectiveness in the definition of what amounts to a
"legitimate interest."
In a fourth articulation, a right holder acts abusively if she exercises
her right contrary to the "normal function" of the right. While similar to
the previous formulation, this formulation gauges the subject's purpose
against the objective criterion of the "normal function" of the right. Since
"normal function" is potentially more susceptible to a restrictive
definition than "legitimate interest," it may entail a higher degree of
limitation on the right. At the height of nineteenth-century industrial
7. BERNHARD wINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DEs PANDEKTENRECHTS [textbook on the Roman Digest
(Pandects)] '53, '55 (1862).
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struggles, unions were found to abuse their right to strike when their
action departed from the right's "normal function."8
Finally, in a fifth formulation, located at the objective end of the
spectrum, a right is abused when exercised contrary to its "socio-
economic purpose."' In this articulation, the focus of the scrutiny is
shifted from the subject's intent to the nature of her conduct. The test
allows sharp limitations of the right holder whose conduct is weighed in
light of larger social needs and interests. Take, for example, a landowner
who, in an arid region, drains ground water from the community's supply
in order to sell it for the irrigation of distant lands. That landowner may
be deemed to use her right contrary to its "socio-economic destination,"
defined as the productive use and enjoyment of land respectful of the
larger needs of the community.
Drawing on an influential comparative law tradition, this Article
investigates the "functional equivalents" of abuse of rights in the
common law. In the 1950s and '96os, at the height of functionalist
comparative law,'0 a copious literature cast light on the operation of
8. Louis JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DEs DRorrs 5-40 (lditions Dalloz 2oo6) (1905).
9. Id.
io. On "functionalism" in comparative law, see Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of
Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 360-63 (2oo6), and Michele
Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS
1oo (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). Max Rheinstein has offered the clearest account
of the functionalist method to date. Every rule, according to Rheinstein, "has to justify its existence
under two inquiries: first, what function does it serve in present society? second, does it serve this
function well or would another rule serve better?" Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law. 5 U.
CHI. L. REv. 615, 617-18 (1938).
Functionalism was a crucial methodological innovation of early-twentieth-century
comparative lawyers. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6Tz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(1977). Saleilles and Lambert's emphasis on a rule's "function" was meant as a powerful critique of the
formalism of conceptual analysis and "legal dogmatics." See Edouard Lambert, La Fonction du Droit
Civil Compare, in ETUDES DE DROIT COMMUN LEGISLATIVE OU DE CIVIL COMPARE (1903); RAYMON
SALEILLES, RAPPORT GENERAL SUR LES TRAVAUX DU CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE LU A
LA SfANCE DU CLOTURE DE CONGRES (1900). The second generation of comparative lawyers further
developed functionalism's critical potential. Roscoe Pound's functionalist approach rested on a set of
critical moves: a critique of "mechanical jurisprudence," a functional definition of law as an instrument
of social control, and an "is to ought" move that derives the normative assessment of law from the
positive facts of social life. See Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 Am. J. COMP. L.
70 (1955) [hereinafter Pound, Comparative Law]; Roscoe Pound, Introduction. i Am. J. COMP. L. I
(1952); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591
(1911). A pragmatic legal science solicits the adjustment of legal principles and doctrines to the human
condition they are to govern, to the findings of the science of society. Legal rules derived from social
needs and functions are effective in "ordering the satisfaction of conflicting and overlapping individual
claims" with a "minimum of friction and waste." See Pound, Comparative Law, supra, at 84. In other
words, law is to be tailored to the discoverable "social objectives" of an ultimately coherent "society."
The "is to ought" move was one of the main targets of the Realist critique. If, on the one hand, Felix
Cohen appropriated the functionalist discourse, denouncing conceptualist legal science as
"transcendental nonsense" and advocating a functionalist jurisprudence, on the other hand, he
rejected the "is to ought" move, viewing functionalism as a crucial tool for an "ethical criticism" of
law. See Fel ix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REV.
[Vol. 6 1:687692
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"functional analogues." Arthur von Mehren magisterially examined the
various techniques employed in French and German law which are used
to solve problems that the common law handles through the doctrine of
consideration." More recently, John Langbein has suggested that trust is
a uniquely Anglo-American institution, foreign to the civil law tradition,
and that Europeans achieve mostly by means of contract what the
Anglo-American systems do through trust." Similarly, Friedrich Kessler
and Edith Fine showed that while the common law seems to have no
counterpart to the German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, notions of
good faith as well as the doctrines of negligence, estoppels, and implied
contract have served many of the functions of culpa in contrahendo."
This corpus of literature has focused mostly on the socio-legal
function performed by analogous private law doctrines, but has neglected
their rhetorical dimension. This dimension includes the arguments and
justifications that common lawyers and civilians provided for functionally
equivalent doctrines, as well as the expectations and anxieties spurred by
those doctrines. Rather than merely identifying abuse of rights'
"functional equivalents," this Article seeks to do full justice to the rich
rhetorical texture of the abuse of rights debate.
In France and in Italy, abuse of rights spurred reactions of dire
condemnation and hyperbolic eulogy. Its critics envisaged it as "a barren
logomachy," a "medieval relic thoughtlessly carried over" 5 or, at best,
809 (1935). Cohen envisaged the normative use of a functional definition of law as the prime danger of
the functional approach. Id. In order to avoid blindness, functionalism should couple an objective legal
science with a critical theory of social values. Id. In recent decades, functionalism has come under
attack on several fronts. It has been charged with reductionism in that it focuses exclusively on rules'
sociolegal function and overlooks a whole range of complicating factors, including culture, mentality,
and ideology. See Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232 (1996); Pierre Legrand,
The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants', 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. III (1997); Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of
the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001). Further, critics claim, functionalism assumes a
"mirror theory" of the relation between law and society and ignores the fact that law acts upon social
interests and needs: the facilitative and ideological role played by law. See Giinter Frankenberg,
Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1985); David Kennedy,
The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra, at
345; Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 510 (1998) (reviewing ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIs BECOME? (1996)). Finally, functionalism
interrogates the comparative effectiveness of functionally equivalent rules, eluding questions of
broader legal reform. See id.; Frankenberg, supra; Kennedy, supra.
I i. Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative
Analysis, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1959).
12. John T. Langebein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629
('995).
13. Fredrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and
Freedom of Contract A Comparative Study, 77 HA~v. L. REV. 401, 401 (1964).




as "a pure piece of sentimentality." 6  By contrast, its champions
acclaimed it as the triumph of a more perfect and broad vision of
justice." The wave of emotion stirred by abuse of rights seems to be far
from drying up. Writing in 1965, Italian jurist Pietro Rescigno noted that
the changing fortunes of abuse of rights are evidence of "the jurist's
agony in redeeming law's ancient misery."' More recently, an experts'
report published by the Council of Europe, reviving nineteenth-century
social rhetoric at its best, concluded that abuse of rights makes it possible
"to establish the connection between the justice ostensibly guaranteed by
positive law and genuine justice." 9
In England and in the United States, the debate over the concept of
"malice" reached similar rhetorical peaks. When discussing "malice,"
common lawyers seemed to lose their habitual aloofness. Gutteridge
described abuse of rights as "an instrument of dangerous potency in the
hands of the demagogue and the revolutionary."" In a 1905 article on the
role of malicious torts in the field of labor relations, Harvard Law School
Professor Bruce Wyman evoked "the horror of anarchy or the
hopelessness of socialism."2
Exploring the rhetoric surrounding abuse of rights and its analogues
may help elucidate the actual stakes of the debate, the multiple and
complexly intertwined questions and interests behind doctrinal disputes
and judicial argumentation. In this way, rhetoric illuminates abuse of
rights' political saliency. The debate over abuse of rights pitted jurists
with different political commitments and various power allegiances
against one another. Further, rhetoric sheds light on jurists' relation with
larger legal ideological models. The debate over abuse of rights is also a
duel between proponents of different models of property: the unitary
and absolutist versus the pluralized and relativized.2 Finally, rhetoric
allows a glimpse of jurists' hidden professional agendas. In France and
Italy, the debate over abuse of rights was critical to the conflict between
15. Vittorio Scialoja, Aemulatio, in I ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA 426 (NAPOLI-MILANO,
1884).
I6. Cf Gutteridge, supra note i, at 43; MARIO ROTONDI, L'ABuso Di DIRrrro "AEMULATIO"
(1979); Vittorio Scialoja, Note to Cassazione Firenze, Foro It. I, 96 (1877).
17. PIETRO RESCIGNO, L'ABUSO DEL DIRITO (1998); I PIETRO RESCIGNO, L'ABUSO DEL DIRTro,
RIv. DIR. CIV. 205 (1965).
18. Supra note 17.
19. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS: THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS
PRESENI DAY APPLICATION 10(1990).
20. Gutteridge, supra note I, at 44.
21. Bruce Wyman, The Perpetuation of the Open Market, 17 GREEN BAG 210, 221 (1905).
22. For the U.S., see Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American
Nuisance Law: r850-1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. I1IO4. 1137, 1184. 1200 (1986). Bone discusses the
normative theories that jurists used to reason about nuisance disputes between the 1850s and the
1920s; he focuses on three different legal-ideological models: the "competing rights~ model, the "static
absolute dominion" model, and the "relative property rights' model. Id.
694 [Vol. 6 1:687
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different segments of the legal-academic profession, as well as to the
relation between academia and the judiciary.
Thus, relying on a "textured functionalism," this Article advances
and explores two hypotheses. First, it suggests that, in vast and highly
transversal areas of the law, such as water law, nuisance, tortious
interference with contractual relations or economic expectancies, and
labor law, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American courts
weighed defendants' motives and conduct through malice tests and
reasonable user rules that closely parallel abuse of rights. However,
contrary to continental European systems where rules limiting a
malicious or unreasonable exercise of one's right congealed in the
unitary conceptual and legislative category of "abuse of rights," in the
United States, these same rules remained largely nonintegrated. This
Article investigates the reasons why a unitary conceptual category of
"abuse of rights" was never developed in the United States.
Second, the comparative analysis of American cases suggests that,
despite the rhetorical hysteria it spurred, abuse of rights' potential as a
tool for social reform was consistently defused. Abuse of rights heralded
two promises. First, it promised to provide a social corrective to the
individualistic language of modern private law: the language of will,
property, and fault. Second, it promised to operate as a critical tool for
progressive lawyering, enabling fair distributive outcomes. Both
promises remained largely unfulfilled.
This Article is divided into two parts. Part I tracks the various
malice rules and reasonableness tests that worked as functional
equivalents of abuse of rights in the common law. It investigates the
techniques of legal reasoning through which nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century American courts operated these rules as well as the
social and economic concerns that drove judges' resort to
"reasonableness" and "malice." Part II shifts the focus from judicial
elaborations to scholarly discussions. It shows that the debate spurred by
the theory of "intentional tort" at the turn of the nineteenth century in
the United States parallels the contemporary European controversy over
abuse of rights.
I. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COURTS
A. THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS: MALICE RULES
AND REASONABLENESs TESTS
For several decades between the second half of the nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth century, abuse of rights assiduously
occupied the minds of continental European jurists. It dominated
academic discussions and it appeared with increasing frequency in courts'
February 2010] 695
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decisions.2 A newly crafted unitary conceptual scheme resting on
medieval sources, it allowed judges to weigh conflicting individual rights,
tempering their absoluteness and amplitude in a variety of legal
subfields. Susceptible of application to both extracontractual rights and
contractual rights, it helped courts deal with questions regarding
relations among neighbors, conflicts over water resources, marital and
paternal authority, the formation of contracts, unilateral recess, business
competition, and conflicts between capital and labor. A central
organizing concept on the Continent, abuse of rights was, allegedly,
hardly of any concern to common law lawyers. The relatively sparse
English literature on abuse of rights insinuates that the concept is
nowhere to be found in the common law. A unitary notion of abuse of
rights was neither part of the conceptual armory of academic writers nor
readily available in the courts' toolbox.
However, a look at courts' records suggests that abuse of rights was,
indeed, silently at work in English and, more significantly, in American
law. The scattered references to continental European theories should
not deceive. In various areas of the law, judges relied on "functional
equivalents" of abuse of rights. In other words, the socio-legal function
played by abuse of rights on the continent, (i.e., limiting the amplitude of
individual rights and balancing conflicting rights) was performed by a
variety of "malice" tests and "reasonable user" rules that, although not
integrated into a unitary category of "abuse of rights," presented a highly
similar conceptual pattern. In disputes as diverse as conflicts between
riparian owners and controversies between employer and employees,
defendants' conduct, otherwise lawful, was deemed to entail liability
either because of its malicious nature or by virtue of its
unreasonableness. Significantly, the hidden conceptual unity of these
various rules did not elude common lawyers. Opinions abounded with
allusions to the parallel operation of similarly structured malice rules in
different areas of the law.
i. Water Law
Water law had long been the terrain on which continental theories
of abuse of rights were elaborated and tested. Justinian law contained
scattered provisions prohibiting aemulatio in relation to water rights,
provisions which were available to medieval jurists in their effort to work
out a general theory of aemulatio." Drawing on these Roman and
medieval precedents, nineteenth-century French and Italian jurists
framed conflicts over competing uses of water as abuses of landowners'
23. ROTONDI, supra note 16, at 6o; Marc Desserteaux, Abus De Droit ou Conflict du Droit, in REV.
TRIMESTRIELLE 129 (1906); JOSSERAND, supra note 8. at 32.
24. ROTONDI, supra note i6, at 36-4-
696 [Vol. 61:687
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property rights." Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum. As the maxim
recites, a landowner's right was said to extend to surface of the land as
well as to everything that is upon or above it to an indefinite height.
However, although exclusive and absolute, this right was deemed to be
susceptible to abuses. Spitefully pumping off the water percolating
underneath one's land, thereby draining the neighbor's well, amounted
to one such instance of abuse.
Not surprisingly, in England and in the United States, courts dealt
with abuses of water rights by relying on rules that closely paralleled the
continental doctrine. For instance, in Acton v. Blundell, a case decided by
the Exchequer Chamber in 1843,' the plaintiff, a cotton spinner, used a
well for the operation of his mill which was fed by underground streams
of water percolating from the soil underneath the land of the
defendants." The latter erected engines and pumps which drained the
water preventing it from flowing and percolating to the plaintiff's well
and thereby caused him pecuniary loss." In the court's assessment, the
draining of the well amounted to damnum absque injuria and could not
become the basis of an action.29 A landowner, the court noted, has the
right to avail herself of all that lies beneath the surface, unless she does
so animo vicino nocendi (i.e., maliciously), with the intent to injure the
neighbor.30 However, since ill will was not alleged, the malice
qualification was dicta.
In Chasemore v. Richards, Lord Wensleydale hinted at a notion of
"reasonable use" that resembled continental notions of "normal
function."3 For sixty years the appellant had owned and operated a mill
on a river, which was fed by the water percolating through the
underground strata from higher lands.32 The respondent, the local Board
of Health of the town of Croydon, for the purpose of augmenting the
town's supply of water and for other sanitary purposes, sunk a large well
in a piece of land situated above the plaintiff's mill.33 The operation of
the well drained the subterranean stream that would have otherwise
flowed into the river, diminishing its flow and therefore hampering the
25. Id. at 141.
26. (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224. The cause was tried before Rolfe, B. at the Liverpool Spring
Assizes in 1841. Against the direction of the judge, the counsel for the plaintiff tendered a bill of
exceptions which was argued before the Court of Exchequer Chamber. Id. at 1232.
27. Id. at 1223.
28. Id. at 1223-24-
29. Id. at 1235. The inferior court instructed the jury that, if the defendants had proceeded and
acted "in the usual and proper manner" for the purpose of working a coal mine, they might lawfully do
so; it further instructed that the plaintiffs evidence was not sufficient to support his allegations. Id. at
1225.
30. Id. at 1228.
31. (1859) II Eng. Rep. 140, 145 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Exch. Div.).
32. Id. at 140.
33. Id. at 141.
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working of the appellant's mill. 34 The latter brought action for damages.
The Court of Exchequer and the Court of Exchequer Chamber gave
judgment in favor of the respondents." The House of Lords confirmed
the decision of the lower courts, affirming the respondent's right to
intercept subterranean streams." Lord Wensleydale, in an opinion which
is "as close to a dissenting judgment as possible without recording a
formal dissent," " carefully investigated the modalities and purposes of
the respondent's use of the water, suggesting that a use not connected
with the enjoyment of the land may be "unreasonable."39
In the United States, notions of "reasonable use" closely resembling
continental objective formulations of "abuse of rights" proved to be
crucial organizing concepts in nineteenth-century water law, a legal field
key to the progress of industrialized agriculture as well as to the
development of manufacturing industry. Starting in the 1820S, water law
took shape as a distinctively American conceptual creation.40 Joseph
Angell's A Treatise on the Common Law in Relation to Watercourses
appeared in 1824, laying the foundations on which Justice Story and
34. Id. at 142.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 152.
38. MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE
STORY OF EDWARD PICKLES AND THE BRADFORD WATER SUPPLY 65 (2002).
39. Chasemore, ii Eng. Rep. at 145 (opinion of Lord Wensleydale). However, a few decades
later, in Corp. of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ch.), the House of
Lords stepped back, finding motives to be immaterial. Corp. of Bradford v. Pickles is another case
involving interference with underground water. The respondent, Mr. Pickles, owned land on a higher
level than the parcel of land acquired by the appellants and used for the operation of the Bradford
Waterworks Company. See id. at 587-88. Allegedly for the purpose of working minerals, Mr. Pickles
drained from the soil the ground water, which would have otherwise percolated to the appellants'
land, thereby reducing the latter's supply of water. Id. at 589. The appellants brought an action seeking
an injunction to restrain the respondent from continuing to sink the shaft or doing anything to draw
off the water or diminish its quantity. Id. They claimed that the respondent was motivated by the
intent to injure, thereby inducing them to purchase his land, rather than by a bona fide intention to
work his minerals. Id. While the inferior court granted the injunction, the Court of Appeals reversed.
Id. The House of Lords confirmed the latter court's decision, dismissing the appeal. Id. at 605. In the
court's analysis it is the act, not the motive for the act, that must be regarded. See id. at 594. The
deliberate nebulosity of George Bell's Principles of the Law of Scotland should not deceive, Lord
Watson warned. Id. at 597-98. The court stated that Aemulatio is a misleading expression and, while
its operative scope in the law of Scotland is narrow-translating in mere variations of degree in cases
of nuisance-it was never part of English law. Id. at 598. On Corp. of Bradford v. Pickles, see
TAGGART, supra note 38, at 54.
40. See Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority. 33 HAm. L. REV. 133. 147
(1919). Wiel notes that "the common law of watercourses is not the ancient result of English law, but is
a French doctrine (modern at that) received into English law only through the influence of two
eminent American jurists." Id.
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Chancellor Kent were to shape the common law of water.41 "Reasonable
user" rules were central to this new conceptual structure. In all of the
three major sub-domains of water law-surface watercourses, ground
water, and diffuse surface water- "reasonable user" doctrines gradually
supplanted earlier rules of allocation.
With regard to the first category of waters (i.e., surface watercourses
in the humid eastern states), riparianism soon emerged as the controlling
doctrine 2.4 According to the riparian doctrine, ownership of riparian land
"creates a perpetual usufructuary right in the landowner to use the
water."43 As to the allocation of water among riparian owners, the earlier
"natural flow" rule," dominant in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth
century, was gradually replaced by the "reasonable user" principle.' The
latter accords the riparian a right to alter the flow when, balanced against
the uses of other riparians, the use is reasonable.46 Anticipated by Justice
Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson,47 the reasonable use rule was fully articulated
in Cary v. Daniels, an 1844 case involving a conflict between lower and
41. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATERCOURSES
(1824); see also I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.,
George F. Comstock ed., iith ed. 1889).
42. See T.E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REV. I (1970); J. H. Beuscher,
Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, xo BUFF. L. REV. 448 (1960).
43. See CHARLES DONAHUE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONCEPT AND INSTITUTION 246 (3d ed. 1993).
44. The "natural flow" rule prohibits any use of the stream by one riparian so as to diminish the
natural flow to the other riparian owners; it allows for modest domestic use, thereby preventing waste,
malicious diversion, or extraordinary use of water. See TAGGART, supra note 38, at 114, 128, 130, 136.
45. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 34, 37-43, 102
(1992).
46. Id.
47. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). In Tyler v. Wilkinson, Justice Story provided a
schizophrenic articulation of the rule that reflected an uneasy transition between the older rule and
the new reasonableness principle. The case involved a typical conflict between riparian mill owners,
where the owners of the upper dam appropriated and used a large quantity of water to the detriment
of the lower dam. Id. at 473. In Story's reasoning, the natural flow principle was still commanding and
the reasonableness test was timidly added as a qualification.
[T]he right being common to all the proprietors on the river, no one has a right to diminish
the quantity which will, according to the natural current, flow to a proprietor below, or to
throw it back upon a proprietor above. This is the necessary result of the perfect equality of
right among all proprietors of that, which is common to all.. . . When I speak of this
common right, I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doctrine, that there can be no
diminution whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian
proprietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of
it. There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common to all, a reasonable
use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is, whether it is to the injury of the
other proprietors or not.... The law here, as in many other cases, acts with a reasonable
reference to public convenience and general good, and it is not betrayed into a narrow
strictness, subversive of common sense, nor into an extravagant lousencss, which would




upper mill owners.8 Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts found that each proprietor is entitled to such use of the
stream, so far as it is reasonable in light of the needs of the community
and the developments in hydraulic technologies. 49
A similar development occurred in the legal regime governing the
second category of waters, underground percolating waters. While earlier
cases relied on the "absolute ownership" rule, occasionally tempered by
a narrow and subjective malice qualification,so by the late-nineteenth
century, courts and writers were shifting towards either a "reasonable
user" criterion or a "correlative rights" rule.? Professor Ernst Huffcut of
Cornell Law School, writing in 1904 in the Yale Law Journal, stated
confidently that "the prevailing American view is that, in order to justify
the cutting off of another's water supply derived from percolating waters,
it is necessary that this should be the result of a reasonable user of
defendant's rights in his own lands."52 In Bassett v. Salisbury,53 a case
regarding the obstruction of the natural drainage of percolating water,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, while clearly articulating the
"reasonable user" rule, also showed an awareness of the hidden
conceptual unity of reasonableness rules operating in various legal
subfields:
The maxim, "Sic utere," &c., therefore applies, and, as in many other
cases, restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a
reasonable use of his own property, in view of the similar rights of
others. Instances of its similar application in cases of water-courses,
where the detention, pollution, or unnatural discharge of the water is
complained of, of highways, of alleged nuisances in regard to air or by
noises &c., &c., and of the manner of the application, are too
numerous and familiar to need more special mention.54
Finally, reasonableness tests were also developed in relation to the
third category of waters, diffused surface waters. In the nineteenth
century and early-twentieth century, run-off water was considered mainly
48. 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466, 477-78 (1844).
49. Id. at 476-77.
50. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 128 (2005).
51. The reasonable use rule was anticipated in a number of earlier cases. In De Bok v Doak, 176
N.W. 631, 632 (Iowa 1920), the plaintiff complained of an alleged injury caused him by defendant-
appellant's use of an excessive amount of water percolating from the ground, not only as drink for his
horses and cattle but also to furnish drink and make a wallow for his hogs. The Supreme Court of
Iowa, affirming the decision of the Circuit Court, which had granted injunctive relief, held that the
appellant defendant had wasted the excess water to the detriment of the plaintiff. Id. at 632-33. Justice
Salinger emphasized the "modern trend" towards a "reasonable use" rule taking into account "the
local conditions, the purpose for which the landowner excavates and the use or non use she makes of
the water." Id. at 634-
52. Ernst W. Huffcut, Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reasonable User, 13 YALE L.J. 222, 223
(1904).
53. 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
54. Id. at 577-
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in terms of disposal and relatively little use was made of it." Previously
governed by an absolutistic "common enemy" rule or by the so called
"civil law" rule, 6 conflicts over surface runoff increasingly came to be
controlled by a "reasonable use" rule." In Short v. Baltimore City
Passenger Railway, the Court of Appeals of Maryland weighed the
competing rights of the appellant, the owner of a house in a Baltimore
neighborhood, and the appellee, a railway company, in light of the
reasonableness of the latter's use of its property.'" After a heavy snowfall,
the railway company, in clearing its track, threw the snow into the
adjoining street.5 9 That same night, it rained hard and the mass of snow
obstructed the natural flow of the water, flooding the appellant's house.
The court affirmed the judgment of the inferior court finding that the
railway company had acted in a "reasonable, usual and proper manner"
and hence the appellant's injury was damnum absque injuria. Similarly,
in City of Franklin v. Durgee, the court declared that "the doctrines of
reasonable necessity, reasonable care and reasonable use prevail in this
state in a liberal form, on a broad basis of general principle."62
2. Nuisance
Nuisance was another area in which issues of abusive exercise of
property rights typically arose. In the common law world, disputes
concerning the spiteful erection of fences, walls, chimneys, and other
structures, largely framed by civilians as instances of "abuse of rights,"
were treated as "private nuisances." 63 As G. H. L. Fridman noted in his
article Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, nuisance, as an area of tort
liability, is central to the discussion of abuse of rights in the common
law.6 4
55. DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 43, at 245-48.
56. In Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (to Allen) io6, so7 (1865), a Massachusetts case, the
defendant, who owned an upper parcel of land, had placed turfs on his own land to protect it from a
considerable flow of surface water caused by melting snow and spring rains, thereby causing the water
to flow off upon the plaintiffs land. Resorting to the language of absolute rights and declaring that
"cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," the court applied the "common enemy" rule. Id. at 1o9.
The owner of a piece of land, Justice Bellow stated, may lawfully use it in such manner as either to
prevent surface water which accumulates elsewhere from coming upon it or to allow surface water to
come upon his land from elsewhere, although the water is thereby made to flow upon the land of an
adjoining landowner to her loss. Id, at lo7-o9.
57. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 432 (3d ed. 2000); 6
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 524-26, 559-61 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
58. 50 Md. 73, 8o (1878).
59. Id.
6o. Id.
6i. Id. at 82.
62. 5i A. 911, 911 (N.H. 1901) (quoting Haley v. Colcord, 59 N.H. 7, 8(1879)).
63. See Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2002).
64. G. H. L. Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. REv. 583, 583 (1954).
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In systems of law derived from the Digest a great deal is said about
abuse of rights; and the law is certainly made simpler and more
patently straightforward by provisions in codes, and case-law
developments therefrom, dealing with jus abutendi, abus des droits, or
schikanerverbot. Such ideas are not to be found as part of the common
law. But it should not be thought that the common law provides no
remedy for such wrongs. There is ample provision in the present law
relating to the tort of nuisance for the control of activities envisaged by
the continental codes.'t
The essence of private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of land. 6" Liability may rest upon the defendant's
intentional interference with the plaintiff's interest, upon a merely
negligent interference, or upon inappropriate and abnormally dangerous
conduct. Therefore, subjective notions of malice, closely resembling
continental aemulatio, and more objective reasonableness tests, echoing
French and Italian notions of "normal function" of a right, proved critical
to determining liability for nuisance. While malice is not necessarily
implied in nuisance, it may be an element in the commission of
*68 -
nuisances. Liability may result from a course of activity maliciously
designed to inflict harm. More often, liability results from the
defendant's unreasonable and excessive exercise of her right. Most late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American courts saw nuisance
disputes as arising from a conflict between two absolute property rights;
in struggling to determine the proper limits on those competing rights
they relied largely on "reasonableness" and "malice rules." 69
American courts' treatment of "spite fence" cases varied
significantly and changed over time. 0 In an earlier stage,7' in six of the
65. Id. at 586.
66. Bone, supra note 22, at I115.
67. See id. at 1139-41.
68. Id. at I161.
69. Id. at 1137.
70. A 1937 case, Racich v. Mastrovich, 273 N.W. 66o, 661 (S.D. 1937), furnished a telling
photograph of a "spite fence," complete with the following description: "a fence erected for no benefit
or pleasure to the person erecting it, but solely with the malicious motive of injuring the adjoining
owner by shutting out his light, air and view."
71. In Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835), the Supreme Court of Judicature
of New York held that the defendant was not liable for erecting a spite fence that obstructed the
sunlight of his neighbor, regardless of the motive of the obstruction, unless the neighbor had
benefitted from that sunlight for a specified period of time or had acquired a right by grant or by
occupation and acquiescence. In a nice display of formalistic reasoning, the court distinguished the
case at hand from the Aldred's case, where the construction of a hog house infesting the neighbor's
property with fetid smells had been found to be a nuisance. Id. at 264. In the latter case, Justice Savage
argued, a positive right had been invaded, every person having a right to the use of natural elements in
their purity. Id. Conversely, in the case at hand, the plaintiff enjoyed a mere easement that may have
ripened into a right. Id. But, hefore sufficient time had elapsed to raise a presumption of a grant, he




ten states in which actions had been brought for the spiteful erection of a
fence, the opinion of the court was against the plaintiff. But by the first
decade of the twentieth century, courts consistently held defendants
liable for maliciously erecting fences or other constructions."
Furthermore, in several states, statutes were passed making the erection
of a spite fence a tort.? In Rideout v. Knox, Justice Holmes reluctantly
upheld one such statute.7 4 In Justice Holmes's reasoning, the "power to
use one's property malevolently" is, to a large extent, an incident of a
right established for very different ends, which cannot be taken away
even by legislation." However, Justice Holmes conceded, limits to
property rights are a matter of degree: while larger limitations would
entail too significant a constraint on the owner's right, smaller limitations
may be imposed for the sake of avoiding a manifest evil." Similarly, in
Horan v. Byrnes, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire applied
"reasonable use" and upheld a statute declaring that any fence
unnecessarily exceeding five feet in height, and erected to annoy an
adjoining owner, shall be a private nuisance." Chief Justice Parsons's
reference to City of Franklin v. Durgee,78  the earlier water case
mentioned above, demonstrates an awareness of the underlying
conceptual unity of the various "reasonable use" tests operating in
different fields of the law:
"The common-law right of the ownership of land... does not sanction
or authorize practical injustice to one landowner by the arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of the right of dominion by another," but makes
the test of the right the reasonableness of the use under all
72. See James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the
Actor, 18 HARV. L. REv. 411, 412,414-15 (1905).
73. Id. at 415. The states were Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington.
Id. at 415 n.3.
74. 19 N. E. 390, 393 (1889).
75. Id. at 392.
76. Id. at 391-92. Justice Holmes's concern with the arbitrariness of a jury's inquiry into motives
echoes the arguments raised by opponents of abuse of rights on the continent:
It has been thought by respectable authorities that even at common law the extent of a
man's rights in cases like the present might depend upon the motive with which he acted.
We do not so understand the common law, and we concede further, that to a large extent
the power to use one's property malevolently in any way which would be lawful for other
ends is an incident of property which cannot be taken away even by legislation. It may be
assumed that under our constitution the legislature would not have the power to prohibit
putting up or maintaining stores or houses with malicious intent, and thus to make a large
part of the property of the commonwealth dependent upon what a jury might find to have
been the past or to be the present motives of the owner. But it does not follow that the rule
is the same for a boundary fence, unnecessarily built more than six feet high. It may be said
that the difference is only one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely analyzed.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. 54 A- 945, 948 (N.H. 1903).
78. 5i A. 911 (N.H. 1901).
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circumstances. In such case the purpose of the use, whether understood
by the landowner to be necessary or useful to himself, or merely
intended to harm another, may be decisive upon the question of right.
It cannot be ustly contended that a purely malicious use is a
reasonable use.
Reasonableness rules were also deployed in cases of nuisance
involving conflicts between industrial enterprises and residential
landowners. In St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, involving a major
episode of industrial pollution, the House of Lords formulated a
reasonableness rule placing emphasis on time and locality." Again, the
existence of a unitary conceptual pattern linking malice rules and
reasonableness tests in disparate legal domains could hardly elude the
court. Lord Wensleydale, who a few years before in Chasemore v.
Richards had boldly alluded to a "reasonable use" rule far exceeding the
narrow scope of subjective "malice," 8 ' approvingly concurred in his
brethrens' articulation of "reasonableness."
3. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations or Economic
Expectancies
Cases of tortious interference with contractual relations were a third
category of cases raising issues of "abuse of rights." These cases were
resolved through malice rules and reasonableness tests similar to
continental doctrines. The typical instance of interference with
contractual relations was that of a third party who, in the exercise of her
lawful right to compete on the market, interfered with an existing or
prospective contractual relation between two parties in order to obtain
some advantage. The question facing the courts was whether the
interloper had abused her right to compete. Until the 1850s, it was widely
assumed that a remedy for a breach of contract could be obtained only
against the other party to the contract.83 Courts accorded contractual
relations protection from a variety of third party interferences, but no
formally unified tort had developed. While the master-servant relation
was shielded, through an action of enticement, from third parties who
persuaded a servant to leave her employment, other contractual
79. Horan, 54 A. at 948 (citation omitted) (quoting Franklin, 51 A. at 913).
8o. (1865) i1Eng. Rep. 1483, 1485.
81. Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) II Eng. Rep. 140, 149.
82. See St. Helen's Smelting Co., ii Eng. Rep. 1483.
83. See Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1510 (1980); Frances Bowes Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 675-76 (1923) ("If this tort is not to be regarded as
simply a particularized manifestation of the old doctrine of Keeble v Hickeringill, its true basis would
seem to lie in the policy of the law to accord to promises the same or similar protection as is accorded
to other forms of property. By lending its protection to promised advantages, the law creates and
secures additional property values which further the social welfare." (footnote omitted)).
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agreements were protected from a variety of interferences such as
slander, libel, fraud, and coercion.84
By the 1850s, socio-economic developments and conceptual
innovations had cast new light on the problem of third parties'
interference. Courts were now inclined to envisage contractual
expectations as a form of property to be afforded absolute protection."
Once again, the concept of "malice" served courts' efforts to provide
such protection. The defendant's right to compete and the plaintiff's
"contractual property" were balanced in light of standards of "malice" or
"unreasonableness." As Prosser lamented in his treatise The Law of
Torts, the law of interference with economic relations became "shrouded
in a fog of catchwords and rubber-stamp phrases,"" most of which turned
on the question of the defendant's malicious motive or purpose.
In Lumley v. Gye, the Court of Queen's Bench extended the action
of enticement to malicious interference with contractual relations other
than the master-servant relation." The case involved a contract between
the plaintiff, the lessee and manager of the Queen's Theatre in London,
and Miss Johanna Wagner, a singer, for her performance for a period of
three months at the plaintiff's theatre.88 The court found that the
defendant, the impresario of a competing theatre, had procured Miss
Wagner to breach the contract with a "malicious intention," and awarded
damages to the plaintiff.
In Temperton v. Russell, the Court of Queens Bench extended the
principle of liability for interference beyond existing contractual relations
to relations which are merely prospective or potential." Lord Esher saw
no distinction between the two categories of relations, given that the
malicious, and hence wrongful, intent and the kind of injury were the
same. 9' As nicely put in a later American case, since a large part of what
is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or less directly
upon "probable expectancies," it would seem inevitable that courts
would "discover, define and protect from undue interference more of
these 'probable expectancies."' 92 However, in Allen v. Flood, an 1897
case involving a union's interference with the relations between an
employer and employees affiliated with a rival union, the role of malice
84. Note, supra note 83, at 1516.
85. Id. at 151i.
86. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 927 (4th ed. i97i).
87. (1853) i18 Eng. Rep. 1o83 (O.B.).
88. Id. at 'o84.
89. Id. at £097.
90. (1893) 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 749 (Q.B.).
91. Id. at 754.
92. Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 A. 230, 233 (N.J. Ch. 1902).
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was minimized.93 A classic in the literature on abuse of rights, Allen v.
Flood is seen as evidence that "abuse of rights" had a short life in
England.9 The House of Lords recast and deactivated the doctrine of
malice. Malice, Lord Watson noted, "depends not upon evil motive
which influenced the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of
the act committed."95
From England, the tort of interference with economic relations
migrated to America. Frances Bowes Sayre, writing in 1922 in the
Harvard Law Review, lamented the "little careful inquiry" American
courts devoted to the precise limits and fundamental nature of the
doctrine.96 In Sayre's words:
Much of the uncertainty surrounding this tort comes from the
shifting ideas which have clustered around the requirement of
"malice." Following in the footsteps of Justice Crompton, courts still
carefully repeat the formula which requires "malice" as one of the
essential elements of the tort. But thus far what constitutes "malice"
93. [1898] A.C. I (H.L.) (appeal taken from E.). Along with Corp. of Bradford v. Pickles, [18951
A.C. 587 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ch.), Allen v. Flood stands as the foremost authority for the
absence of abuse of rights in English law. The appellant, Allen, the delegate of the iron-workers'
union, in order to punish the respondents, a group of shipwrights who had in the past engaged in
practices resisted by the union, had informed the employer that unless the latter were discharged, all
the iron-workers would be called out. Allen, [1898] A.C. at 90-91. Pressed by this threat, the employer
discharged the shipwrights and refused to employ them again. Id. The respondents brought an action
against the appellant. The inferior court awarded damages to the respondents. Id. at 143. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Id. at 9!. Reversing the latter court's decision, the House of
Lords gave judgment in favor of the appellant arguing that, however malicious or bad his motive might
be, he had done no unlawful act. Id. at 1o9. A deep and hardly disguisable anxiety permeates the
court's profuse discussion of the essence and the scope of malice. The court was eager to vindicate and
defend its role as the arbiter of social and economic conflict. The conceptual vagueness of malice is
said to threaten legal certainty by putting the assessment of human actions at the mercy of juries,
hence resulting in great danger for the community and for individual freedom. Retrieving the well-
know adagio of malice's conceptual obscurity, the court restated the doctrine. The definition provided
by the court is the same as that offered by the court in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, (1889) 23
Q.B.D. 598: a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse; the emphasis, however, is
on the wrongful nature of the act, rather than on the presence of a just cause. By shifting the emphasis
from the motive to the nature of the act, the court closed the narrow space left open for a theory of
abuse of rights in the Mogul case. In the Allen court's words:
For the purpose then in hand [in the Mogul case] the statement of the law may be accurate
enough, but if it means that a man is bound in law to justify or excuse every wilful act which
may damage another in his property or trade, then I say, with all respect, the proposition [of
Lord Bowen] is far too wide; everything depends on the nature of the act, and whether it is
wrongful or not.
[1898] A.C. at 139-40.
94. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
95. Allen, [1898] A.C. at 94 ("The root of the principle is that, in any legal question., malice
depends not upon evil motive which influenced the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of
the act which he contemplated and committed. In my opinion it is alike consistent with reason and
common sense that when the act done is, apart from the feelings which prompted it, legal, the civil law
ought to take no cognizance of its motive.").
96. Sayre, supra note 83, at 672.
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has been passed over in silence or covered by remarks of the most
ambiguous nature.?
In fact, in cases of interference with contractual relations as well as
in cases of interference with prospective economic advantage, malice was
variously framed. While in sparse instances American courts deemed
malice irrelevant, a majority of cases held the defendant liable for
maliciously or unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's "contractual
property."" In Chambers v. Baldwin, an 1891 case of interference with a
contract for the sale of tobacco, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky found
that the defendant, in inducing the purchaser of the crop to break the
contract, had exercised rather than abused his right to compete on the
market of goods, his alleged malicious motives being immaterial.99 Once
again, the reasoning of the court demonstrates an awareness of a hidden
unitary conceptual structure. The court explicitly drew on water cases to
affirm the irrelevance of motive and the absoluteness of the defendant's
right. Justice Lewis quoted Chatfield v. Wilson and other earlier water
cases to the effect that "[a]n act legal in itself, and which violates no
right, cannot be made actionable on account of the motive which induced
it."" As the landowner who diverts subterranean percolating waters
does so in the exercise of her absolute property right, so a tobacco dealer
who interferes with a contractual relation between the seller and another
buyer to become purchaser in his stead, does so in the exercise of his
right to compete on the market.
In contrast, in Jones v. Leslie, a 19io case of interference with an
employment contract, the court found malicious motives material.'0' The
plaintiff, formerly an employee of the defendant, had found a better job
and had an oral contract with the new employer.0 2 The defendant
induced the latter to discharge the plaintiff by threatening to drive him
out of business if he employed the plaintiff.i The Supreme Court of
Washington fitted the fact pattern within the mould of a subjective
notion of malice as wanton malevolence.0 4
Most courts, however, used broader tests that focused on the
reasonableness of the interloper's purpose rather than on her mere
malevolent intent. In a 1911 case of interference with economic relations,
the Supreme Court of Iowa assessed the interloper's conduct in light of a
"reasonableness" standard and explicitly suggested the parallel with
97. Id.
98. See generally Note, supra note 83.
99. 15 S.W. 57, 57 (Ky. 1891).
too. Id. at 59 (quoting Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855)).
101. 112 P. 81, 8i (wash. 1910).
10 2. Id.
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id. at 84.
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water cases and nuisance cases. 05 A wealth of water cases and labor
cases, Justice Weaver noted, provide authority for the proposition that
an act which is legally right when done without malice may become
legally wrong when done "maliciously, wantonly or without reasonable
cause."io6
4. Labor Law
Finally, inquiries into motives and notions of "reasonable exercise
of a right" were central to emerging modern labor law. In 19ol, in Quinn
v. Leatham,'" the House of Lords, faced with a conflict between capital
and labor, retrieved the notion of malice previously ruled out in Allen v.
Flood. The appellant was an official of a meat workers' union
determined to unionize the respondent, owner of a slaughter yard, who
was not willing to bend to the union's pressures.to Quinn and other
officials notified the retail butcher to whom the respondent regularly sold
all of his product that, unless he ceased dealing with the latter, they
would call out his workers." As a consequence, the retail butcher sent a
telegram to the respondent, letting him know that he would no longer
buy his meat."0 The latter, who, having just killed a quantity of fine meat,
suffered great economic loss, brought action against the appellants."'
The inferior court gave judgment in favor of the respondent and the Irish
Court of Appeal affirmed."' Quinn alone appealed and the House of
Lords affirmed the decision of the latter court, finding the appellant to
have acted maliciously." 3 Lord Shand disguised the court's sudden drift
in the understanding of malice with bold and abstract claims as to law's
illogical nature:
[A] case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny
that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow
logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is
necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge
that the law is not always logical at all. My Lords, I think the
application of these two propositions [the first being that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved]
renders the decision of this case perfectly plain, notwithstanding the
decision of the case of Allen v. Flood."'
105. Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.W. 371, 371 (Iowa 1911).
io6. Id. at 373.
107. Quinn v. Leatham, [i901] A.C. 495 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (U.K.).
io8. Id. at 496.
io9. Id.
i lo. Id.
II I. Id. at 495.
112. Id.
113. ld. at 533.
114. Id. at So6.
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Likewise, in the United States, at the turn of the nineteenth century,
notions of "malice" played a significant role in the development of labor
law. American courts deployed reasonableness tests to widen or narrow
the scope of permitted collective action. Early American labor cases are
said to reflect "a spirit of medievalism with its antagonism to the working
classes.""5 These cases involved criminal indictments for conspiracy
rather than injunction or damage suits. The unions' very right to exist
was at stake. In the i8o6 case of the Philadelphia cordwainers, a
combination to raise wages was held illegal;"6 in an 1835 New York case,
People v. Fisher, the court took the same view."' As Edwin Witte noted
in the Yale Law Journal in 1925, Commonwealth v. Hunt marked "the
overthr[o]w of these archaic doctrines and the beginning of the modern
law of labor combinations."" 8 Rather than questioning the union's right
to exist or the legality of the combination itself, the court focused on the
purpose sought and the means employed by the union."9 In the following
decades, criminal conspiracy cases became less frequent and, in a number
of states, legislation repealing the conspiracy doctrine was enacted.'20
By the 1890s, with the tremendous rise in both the size and the
organization of labor unions, the old doctrine of criminal conspiracy had
been abandoned.' 2' Courts came to rely extensively on the labor
injunction, an equitable remedy, justifying it as the protection of a newly
coined concept of "entrepreneurial property rights" from irreparable
injury.'22 Further, tort law provided an alternative remedy. Picketing,
strikes, and secondary boycotts were subsumed within the category of
malicious torts. Courts focused on the purposes driving unions, assessing
them in terms of wanton malice, reasonableness, and lack of legitimate
interest.
For instance, in Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, an 1889 Ohio
boycott case, Justice Taft resorted to a reasonableness test that echoed
continental ideas of "normal operation of [a] right."' 23 A bricklayers
union, seeking to coerce an employer to accept its requests, sent the
latter's customers a circular stating that any dealings with him would lead
115. Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 825 (1926) (quoting GEORGE
GORHAM GROAT, AlTITUDE OF AMERICAN COURTS IN LABOR CASES 49 (191)).
i6. See id. at 826 (citing 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 68, 233 (John
R. Commons & E. A. Gilmore eds., 1910)).
I 7. 14 Wend. 9, 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
i18. Witte, supra note I5, at 825 (citing Commonwealth v. Hunt, 58 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1849)).
i 19. Hunt, 45 Mass. at ii i.
120. See Witte, supra note I i5.
121. See id.
I322. Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights:
Boycotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of T886-T895, 8 INDUs. REL. L.J. 307, 308 (1986).
123. xo Ohio Dec. Reprint 665 (1889).
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to similar measures against them.'24 One of the customers, the Moore's
Lime Company, upon receiving the circular, stopped selling lime to the
employer by delivery. However, the employer then sent a "teamster" to
buy the lime directly from Moore's. 2 ' Having disregarded the union's
circular, the Moore's Lime Company was banned and brought an action
for damages.126 The question facing the court was whether the defendant
union had unreasonably or maliciously exercised its right to the free
pursuit of trade. Justice Taft assessed the "immediate motive" driving the
Bricklayers' Union in light of the "normal operation of the right to
labor" and found it malicious. 7
5. A Hidden Unitary Concept?
Although operating in an analogous fashion in all these various legal
subfields, "malice" and "reasonableness" rules never congealed into a
unitary category of "abuse of rights." At times, common law lawyers
have regarded the absence of a unitary category of abuse of rights with
regret, attributing it to the flaws of common-law-style legal thinking. As
one observer noted:
The piece-meal, empiricist approach to judicial decision-making that
characterizes the common law is its greatest weakness as well as its
greatest strength. ..
[I]n so far as a malicious or improper motive is relevant to the
determination of a legal right in our law, we probably will now reach
the same result as those jurisdictions which have the doctrine [of abuse
of rights]; but fourth, the reluctance of our courts to consider the
theoretical foundations of our law has resulted in a legal fabric that
abounds with loose ends, and requires constant ad hoc patching." 8
However, cross-references in cases dealing with water rights,
nuisance, tortuous interference with economic relations, and labor law
are not the only evidence of courts' awareness of an overarching
conceptual scheme. Individual personalities also played a role in
designing an unstated, though powerfully operative, conceptual structure
resembling "abuse of rights." A significant number of the decisions
discussed in this Article were rendered by the Supreme Courts of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These two courts, under the
guidance of, respectively, Chief Justice Shaw and Chief Justice Doe, were
at the vanguard of legal thinking. They were the laboratory where
reasonableness standards fashioned on a unitary mold were elaborated.
124. Id. at 665.
125. Id. at 666.
£26. Id. at 665.
127. Id. at 672.
iz28. Note, Abuse of Rights: Civil Law, Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited, 8 U. BRYT.
CoLUM. L. REV. 343, 348-50 (1973).
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Well-read jurisprudents conversant with European legal theory, Justices
Doe and Shaw may have been well aware of the parallel with the
continental theories of abuse of rights.' In any case, Justices Doe and
Shaw's innumerable discussions of "reasonable use" or "reasonable
exercise of a right" betray awareness of an underlying unitary
framework.3o
Furthermore, a clear sense of the conceptual unity of the scheme
emerges from Jeremiah Smith's opinions and writings. A colleague of
Doe on the New Hampshire bench, Smith, in a series of articles, analyzed
the questions raised by "malice" and "reasonableness" rules in
apparently distant fields (i.e., relations among neighbors and labor
disputes).' 3 ' Although aware of the unitary nature of such rules, Smith
expressed skepticism towards the general categories and mathematical
formulas relied upon by his continental colleagues:
The question of legal regulation of conflicting rights is not confined
to rights in regard to the use of land, but extends to all cases of
conflicting rights as to other matters or subjects....
It is generally admitted that it is impossible to frame a rule so
definite that its application will instantly solve all cases of conflicting
rights..... "The respective rights and liabilities of adjoining landowners
cannot be determined in advance by a mathematical line or a general
formula." As we said in regard to so-called "private nuisances": "No
hard and fast rule controls the subject, for a use that is reasonable
under one set of facts would be unreasonable under another." 32
B. REASONABLENESS TESTS: UNORTHODOX LEGAL REASONING?
Although not integrated into a unitary concept of "abuse of rights,"
as in France and in Italy, malice rules and reasonableness tests were, in
fact, unified through a unitary mode of reasoning. When applying these
rules, American courts relied on techniques for doctrinal analysis and
modes of justification that were hardly consistent with the dictates of so-
called "Classical Legal Thought." Attempts at balancing and cost-benefit
129. See FREDERICK H. CHASE, LEMEUL SHAW: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1830-1860 (1918); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW (1957); JOHN P. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967); see
also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES
(1976).
130. See, e.g., Green v. Gilbert, 6o N.H. 144, 145 (i88o); Thompson v. Androscoggin River
Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545, 547 (1874).
131. See Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justification for Damage to a
Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383 (1917) [hereinafter Smith, Reasonable Use]; Jeremiah Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation IIL, 20 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1906) [hereinafter Smith, Crucial Issues Il].
132 Smith, Reasonable Use, supra note 131, at 384-85 (footnote omitted) (quoting Middlesex Co.




analysis, as well as justifications drawn from social morals and inquiries
into the social consequences of legal doctrines coexisted, at times in the
same opinion,33 with deductive and formalistic reasoning.'34 Although
still rudimentary and abstract if compared with post-World War II
"conflicting considerations" analysis,135 these early instances of balancing
and policy reasoning invite a recharacterization of nineteenth-century
legal reasoning, one that places less emphasis on the discontinuity
between subsequent styles of thought and more on courts' continuous
reliance on both instrumentalist and formalist modes of reasoning.
A substantial body of legal historical scholarship has traced a neat
picture of the orthodox mode of legal thinking dominant in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century.136 The "Formal Style," which
around the 1850s ousted an earlier "Grand Style,"037 featuring clear
reasoning and attention to policy, was seen as resting on a number of
related assumptions.'13 In Karl Llewellyn's words: "the rules of law are to
decide the cases"; policy is for the legislature rather than the courts;
"opinions run in deductive form with an air, or expression, of single-line
inevitability"; the legal order is an ordered system of rules and
principles.139
Subsequent historical work has further elaborated on this picture."
Variously named, "Classical Legal Thought," "Formalism," or "Classical
Orthodoxy" has been described as a relatively homogenous and coherent
mode of thought.' 4' While the actual characterization and the political
nature of legal classicism are a matter of dispute,'42 there is substantial
133. See Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American
Styles of Judicial Reasoning in the 19th Century, 1975 Wis. L. REV. I; infra notes 182, 184.
134. See Scheiber, supra note 133; infra notes 182, 184.
135. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
Consideration and Form, 1oo COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2ooo).
136. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW (1938).
137. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 136.
138. Id. at 73.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2oo6);
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pr. L. REV. 1(1983); HORWITz, supra note 45.
141. See Grey, supra note 140.
142. American historians have drawn different images of late-nineteenth-century formalist legal
thought. Duncan Kennedy offered a nuanced understanding of Classical Legal Thought. For Kennedy,
Classical Legal Thought was a mode of thought providing a conceptual vocabulary, organizational
schemes, modes of reasoning, and characteristic arguments. Classical Legal Thought had no essence,
but presented a number of dominant or important traits. More specifically, in Kennedy's own words:
My claim was that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, legal actors dramatically
revised the conceptual apparatus, reasoning techniques, ideals and images that had
dominated in the pre-Classical period. The Classical subsystem built all legal rules out of a
will theory using strictly analogous conceptions of state and federal power private right.
Private law rules were elaborately divided and subdivided around the public/private
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agreement on its two major implications for judicial reasoning. First,
judicial outcomes were deduced, either logically inferred or analytically
derived, 43 from "relatively small number of conceptually ordered
abstract principles. Further, in justifying their outcomes, judges appealed
to law's internal coherence rather than to "the norms' purposes, the
general policies underlying the legal order, or the extrajuristic
preferences of the interpreter."'" Vague standards, such as
reasonableness, or rules requiring determinations of state of mind, such
as malice, are thought to have been largely foreign to this style of
reasoning.'45
distinction within private law. The preferred reasoning technique was induction/deduction,
the ideal was the deployment of democratically validated public power as the framework for
private freedom, and the key image was powers and rights that were "absolute within their
spheres."
KENNEDY, supra note 140, at xi. For Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought was not the view of law of a
particular political ideology: it was "liberal in either a conservative or a progressive way, according to
how it balanced public and private in market and household." Kennedy, supra note 2, at 22. Classical
Legal Thought was also not "a philosophy of law in the usual sense: in each period there was
positivism and natural law," as well as various theories of rights and pragmatisms. Id.; see also
KENNEDY, supra note 140. Morton Horwitz, on the other hand, focused more on the relation between
legal thought and ideology, between Classical Legal Thought and Liberal Legalism. Classical Legal
Thought was intimately linked to a "central aspiration of American legal thinkers," the separation
between law and politics, and the quest for an "autonomous system of law untainted by politics."
HORWITZ, supra note 45, at 9. After the trauma of the Civil War and at a moment of swift social and
economic change, jurists sought even more fervently to create a system of autonomous law. Id. at io.
Through a process of systematization, integration, and abstraction they built a coherent legal
architecture that "sought to depoliticize law by mediating a series of basic contradictions in antebellum
legal thought." Id. his legal architecture was characterized by: (a) the private/public distinction; (b) the
creation of increasingly abstract and general legal classifications and categories such as will,
ownership, or fault; (c) clear, distinct bright-line classifications of legal phenomena; and (d) deductive
and analogical reasoning which conferred upon legal reasoning "the qualities of certainty and logical
inexorability." Id. at 16. Finally, Thomas Grey focused on the epistemological premises of Classical
Orthodoxy. In Grey's analysis, Classical Legal Science was "a set of ideas to be put to work from
inside by those who operate legal institutions." Grey, supra note 140, at 6. It envisioned the legal
system as "complete" (i.e., "its substantive norms provide a uniquely correct solution-a 'right
answer' -for every case that can arise under it") through "universal formality" (i.e., the outcomes of
the system are dictated by rationally compelling reasoning). Id. at 7. The system can be made
universally formal" through "conceptual order" (i.e., the "substantive bottom-level rules can be
derived from a small number of relatively abstract principles and concepts, which themselves form a
coherent system"). Id. at 8. Grey emphasized the analogy between Classical Orthodox Legal Science-
which claims to be empirical and yet highly conceptual, experimental, and inductive-and Euclidean
geometry, seen, in the late-nineteenth century, as a set of "well-confirmed inductive generalizations
about the physical world." Id. at 16-17. "For legal science, the universe of data was not the totality of
sense experience of the physical world, but the restricted set of reported common law decisions. ... "
Id. at 20. For a more recent view, see WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1866-1937 (1998).
143. Grey, supra note 14o, at 7-8.
r44. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCEs, 8634, 8634 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
145. Grey, supra note 14o, at I I.
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Abuse of rights cases complicate this understanding of legal
classicism because courts consistently resorted to unorthodox reasoning
techniques. The operation of reasonableness standards required two
major modifications in courts' "orthodox" reasoning technique. First,
deduction yielded to balancing. Rather than deducing limits to individual
rights from abstract principles, judges weighed the defendant's and the
plaintiff's conflicting rights in light of multifactor reasonableness
standards allowing an assessment of geographical, technological, and
economic elements.4 6  Second, justificatory arguments changed
significantly. The factual nature of a judgment of "reasonable exercise of
a right" opened up space for policy-based justifications. Rather than
invoking the legal system's logical cogency or internal coherence, judges
became more inclined to discuss openly the social consequences of their
decisions and to rely on extra-juristic considerations."4
Nevertheless, this instrumental style of reasoning retained elements
of formalism. While the language of balancing and cost-benefit
comparison was often abstract and vague,'48 the outcomes' "air of single-
line inevitability" was hardly attenuated.'49 Moral norms supposedly
rooted in the aspirations of the community, policies allegedly finding
wide support in society, and informed experiential propositions' all
substantiated the standard of "reasonableness." This conferred a patina
of universality and inevitability upon courts' justifications and lifting
them out of the incandescent arena of policy preferences.
Of the thousands of decisions rendered by Chief Justice Shaw
during his thirty years at the head of the Massachusetts bench, there are
numerous examples that exemplify this unorthodox style of reasoning.'
A figure of transition, operating at the moment when the "Grand Style"
was gradually yielding to classical orthodoxy, Chief Justice Shaw heavily
relied on reasonableness tests."' On the one hand, Justice Shaw, deeply
preoccupied with basic principles, envisaged law as a science founded on
reason and strove to impart system and symmetry to the law. On the
other hand, in the course of Justice Shaw's tenure, Massachusetts
experienced swift economic development and social change.' Justice
Shaw embarked resolutely on the task of accommodating legal doctrine
to meet the new problems posed by a rapidly changing environment and
146. See discussion supra Part I.A.i-4.
147. See discussion supra Part I.A.I-4.
148. See ROGER COTITERRELL, THE POLrrICs OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION To LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 200 (1989).
149. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 136.
15o. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14 (1988).
15 I. See, e.g.. Thurber v. Martin. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 394 (1854).
152. See generally LEVY, supra note I29; BENJAMIN FRANKLIN THOMAS. SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND
JUDICIAL LABOR OF CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (x868).
153. LEVY, supra note 129, at 22.
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turbulent economic growth. Constantly searching for ways to adapt the
old to the new, Justice Shaw used reasonableness tests -extracted from a
shared, and hence non-contentious, common sense-to restate legal
fields as diverse as water law and labor law in order to make them
"practical and plastic."' 54 Reasonableness satisfied both his quest for
general principles as well as his idea of law as responsive to shifting social
conditions.
In Justice Shaw's analysis, a variety of factors determine the
judgment of reasonableness. A reasonable use of one's property is a
question of degree,'55 purpose, natural and geographical conditions,'5 ' and
technological advancement. To illustrate, in Thurber v. Martin, Justice
Shaw, called to assess the reasonableness of the use of a stream of water,
declared that:
In determining what is such reasonable use, a just regard must be had
to the force and magnitude of the current, its height and velocity, the
state of improvement in the country in regard to mills and machinery,
and the use of water as a propelling power, the general usage of the
country in similar cases, and all other circumstances bearing upon the
question of fitness and propriety in the use of the water in the
particular case.5
While Justice Shaw's balancing of the landowners' competing
interests is an exercise in pragmatic and purpose-oriented comparative
reasoning, the allusion to social customs and shared notions of propriety
and fitness prevented him from seeing the case as requiring an analytic
choice between alternative policies as to the nature and goal of property.
A similar judicial philosophy, and a similar propensity towards
reasonableness standards, is typical of another anomalous "classicist,"
Chief Justice Doe of New Hampshire. Basset v. Salisbury'59 and Swett v.
Cutts"' signaled the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's turn to the
standard of "reasonableness" that Justice Doe would further perfect. In
the latter case, Chief Justice Bellow weighed the conflicting rights of two
adjoining landowners disputing the diversion of the flow of surface water
in the season of melting snow, and equated "reasonable use" to
domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes.'6' Further, Justice
Bellow clarified the factual assessment of reasonableness by listing,
among the circumstances to be considered, "the nature and importance
154. Id. at 24.
155. Elliott v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass (ro Cush.) 191, 194 (1852).
156. Thurber, 68 Mass. at 396-97.
157. Id.
158. Llewellyn saw Justice Doe as an exception in the "Formal Style." See LLEWELLYN, supra note
136, at 41.
159. 43 N.H. 569, 577-78 (1862).




of the improvements sought to be made," "the extent of the interference
with the water," "the amount of injury done to the other land-owners as
compared with the value of such improvement," and, finally, "whether
such injury could or could not have been reasonably foreseen."I62
An Associate Justice when Swett v. Cutts was decided, Charles Doe
became Chief Justice in 1876.'6' In the twenty years of Justice Doe's
tenure, reasonableness became a general principle in the law of torts and
the instrument for balancing conflicting rights.'6' Justice Doe's
predilection for reasonableness was rooted in his methodological beliefs.
In Justice Doe's understanding, law was "experience developed by
reason, and reason checked and directed by experience."' 6 ' For Justice
Doe, legal doctrines were justifications for results obtained by reason
and justice, where the latter stood for fairness and practicality. This
notion of "justice" led the Chief Justice to favor balancing as a reasoning
technique, and reasonableness as the guiding criterion. Far from being a
vague standard for the lazy, reasonableness took effort to apply; it was to
be extracted from the shared norms and practices of a changing society.
In Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., Justice Doe
laid bare the complexities of an assessment of reasonableness in the use
of property."6 Drawing on an earlier case, he discussed a hypothetical
"unreasonable use" by a riparian owner who had made a deep cut
through the river's bank.6 , Justice Doe emphasized that the reasonable
expectation of damage is only one of the many factors figuring in "the
catalogue of all the possible elements of reasonableness and
unreasonableness." 68 In Green v. Gilbert, called to decide whether a mill
owner who had devised an ingenious mechanism to discharge the
sawdust into a river had exercised his property rights reasonably, Justice
Doe further specified the nature of reasonablenesst Reasonableness, he
noted, is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the case,
162. Id. at 446.
163. JEREMIAH SMITH, MEMOIR OF HON. CHARLEs DOE, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEw HAMPSHIRE 24-25 (1897).
164. REID, supra note 129, at 133.
Though Mr. Holmes has received most of the credit for awakening the bar to the need for a
theory of torts and for developing the main lines along which that theory was first
formulated, others were working in the vineyard, notably Charles Doe; his determination to
bring rationality to the chaotic patterns of tort liability is one of the most significant
contributions to American law.
Id. at 133-34. "As we shall see in a future chapter, few judges expected as much from the concept of
'reasonableness' as did Doe. He called it a 'general principle' and in the law of torts made it the
instrument for resolving most factual issues." Id. at 145; see also WHITE, supra note 129, at 124.
165. REID, supra note 129, at 339.
166. 54 N.H. 545 (1874).
I67. Id. at 550-51I-
168. Id. at 551-
169. 6o N.H. '44, 145 (i880).
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including the purposes, old and new, of the parties' use, and upon a
comparative assessment of the respective costs and benefits."' Justice
Doe recognized, with the founder of Germany's "Interests
Jurisprudence," Philipp Heck,' 7 ' that "law operates in a world full of
competing interests and, therefore, always works at the expense of some
interests," but for him, as for Shaw, a multifactor standard of
"reasonableness" grounded in societal experience provided the correct
and desirable balance.172
Courts were well aware of the implication of reasonableness
standards for legal reasoning. Occasionally, they engaged in an explicit
and sharp critique of the classicist deductive mode, advocating an
instrumental style of judicial analysis. In Tuttle v. Buck, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, faced with the question of defining the proper scope
of competition and of deciding which injury to permit without
compensation, declared that abstract maxims about malicious motives
are of little avail to courts. 3 Rather, the court acknowledged that the
question of competition is to be decided by weighing competing social
and economic objectives.174 Justice Elliott profusely elaborated on this
new style of reasoning and the judicial philosophy inspiring it.'75 In
Justice Elliott's vision, balancing is a corollary of a new organicist notion
of law and legal change:
Mr. Justice Black said that "mischievous motives make a bad case
worse, but they cannot make that wrong which in its own essence is
lawful." .. . Such generalizations are of little value in determining
concrete cases....
We do not intend to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the
subject, or become entangled in the subtleties connected with the
words "malice" and "malicious." We are not able to accept without
limitations the doctrine above referred to, but at this time content
ourselves with a brief reference to some general principles. It must be
remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and that its
development has been determined by the social needs of the
community which it governs. It is the resultant of conflicting social
forces, and those forces which are for the time dominant leave their
impress upon the law. It is of judicial origin, and seeks to establish
doctrines and rules for the determination, protection, and enforcement
of legal rights. Manifestly it must change as society changes and new
rights are recognized. To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere
abstraction, it must gradually adapt itself to changed conditions.
Necessarily its form and substance has been greatly affected by
prevalent economic theories. For generations there has been a
170. Id. at 144.
171. PHILLIPP HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG UND INTERESSENJURIPRUDENZ (1929).
172. See Green, 6o N.H. at '45.





practical agreement upon the proposition that competition in trade and
business is desirable, and this idea has found expression in the
decisions of the courts as well as in statutes. But it has led to grievous
and manifold wrongs to individuals, and many courts have manifested
an earnest desire to protect the individuals from the evils which result
from unrestrained business competition. The problem has been to so
adjust matters as to preserve the principle of competition and yet guard
against its abuse to the unnecessary injury to the individual."'6
Courts' language and reasoning techniques in abuse of rights cases
seem to add evidence to the growing strand of revisionist scholarship that
invites a more nuanced understanding of late-nineteenth-century legal
thought. Writing in the mid-1970s, Harry Scheiber significantly
downplayed the allegedly blunt discontinuity between an instrumental
"Grand Style," dominant until the 185os, and a subsequent formalist
style, heavily dependent on deduction and conceptual coherence. 7
Rather, Scheiber contended that late-nineteenth-century judicial
reasoning may be best characterized as an "amalgam" of
"instrumentalism" and "formalism.""' Scheiber's study of post-1865
decisions on property, eminent domain, and resource-allocation law
sought to show that instrumentalism was alive and well in the late-
nineteenth century.179 Even when they posited highly formalist theories
of higher law and inalienable rights, judges simultaneously relied on
reasoning methods and on concepts, such as "public purpose" or "Public
use," that validated broad discretion in setting economic priorities.I
More recently, legal historians have questioned the idea that all late-
nineteenth-century private law jurisprudence operated under a unified
Langdellian paradigm, pointing at the diversity that characterizes
Classical legal thought.'"' "Anomalous" figures, such as Justice Stephen
Field or James Coolidge Carter, it has been argued, may be more
exemplary of late-nineteenth-century legal thinking than Langdell.' A
176. Id. (internal citations omitted).
177. Scheiber, supra note 133. Schieber's article is a response to the discontinuity thesis advanced
by William Nelson, who argud that the "instrumental" style of judicial reasoning fell into disfavor after
the 185os and was supplanted by a "formalist" style. See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-
Slavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV.
513 ('974). A significant causal factor explaining this shift is, in Nelson's analysis, the success of anti-
slavery jurisprudence. See id. The moral crisis over slavery discredited the amoral instrumentalism
which had become an obstacle on the path of the anti-slavery movement and called for a principle-
oriented jurisprudence reinforced by greater use of precedent. See id.
178. Scheiber, supra note 133, at 12.
179. Id.
i8o. Id.
181. See infra notes 182, 184.
1 82. See Forum, Once More Unto the Breach: Late Nineteenth Century Jurisprudence Revisited, 20
LAW & H-isi. REV. 541 (2002). See, in particular, Manuel Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and Free Soil,
Free Labor Constitutionalisrn, 20 LAW & HisT. REv. 541 (2002); Lewis A. Grossman. James Coolidge
Carter and Mugwurnp Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & Hiss. REV. 577 (2002) [hereinafter Grossman,
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theistically oriented historical jurisprudence that looked at morals and
social customs coexisted with and rivaled Langdellian formalist
orthodoxy.'83 Others seek to discard the formalist-realist antithesis.
Throughout the formalist age, Brian Tamanaha contends, prevailing
understandings of law and of judicial decisionmaking were, in essential
respects, as realist as the accounts propounded by later Realists. 8 , Most
legal professionals were well aware that law is indeterminate, that judges
make policy decisions, and that personal predilections may influence
judicial outcomes. 85
The examination of abuse of rights cases may contribute to a further
thickening of the revision. While the political tilt of Classical Legal
Thought has been intensely debated,'8 6 its style of legal reasoning may be
more various than assumed. In circumscribed, though critical, legal
subfields, courts resorted to rudimentary forms of balancing and extra-
juristic justificatory arguments well before the echoes of Sociological
Jurisprudence were heard. This technical and stylistic variety may have
conferred on Classical Legal Thought an inner resilience, contributing to
its longevity.
C. A DRUG WITH VERY DISAGREEABLE AFTER-EFFECTS OR A BUTTRESS
FOR ECONoMIc GROWTH?
Despite the anxiety with which Professor Gutteridge was left after
conversing with civilian colleagues, the "continental drug" fell short of
having "very disagreeable after-effects" in the United States."' Malice
rules and reasonableness tests were deployed to achieve a wide variety of
Mugwump Jurisprudence]; Lewis A. Grossman, Extending the Revisionist Project, 20 LAW & HIST. REV.
639 (2oo2); and Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631 (2002).
183. Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 182, at 604.
184. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the "Formalist" Age 3 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Tamanaha, The Realism of the "Formalist"], available at
ssrn.com/abstract=985083. Tamanaha challenges the view that depicts Holmes as a solitary "proto-
Realist." Id. By contrast, he argues that the standard account of the "formalist" age is fundamentally
wrong; "Prevailing understandings of law and of judicial decision making throughout the [formalist]
era period were, in essential respects, every bit as realistic as the accounts propounded by the later
Realists." Id. "Realist" notions and a "realist" vocabulary were used in a variety of contexts:
effectuating legal reform or legal change, doing justice in particular cases, expressing concern about
judicial elections, promoting codification, and criticizing courts for excessive judicial invalidation of
legislation. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 67-go (2009) [hereinafter
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE DIVIDE]. In Tamanaha's account, the Realists are "the latest episode in a long
history of skepticism about the common law and judging prompted by concerns about the disordered
state of the law, or by objections, often politically motivated, to the actions of courts." Tamanaha, The
Realism of the "Formalist," supra, at 65; see David J. Seipp, Formalism and Realism in Fifteenth-
Century English Law: Bodies Corporate and Bodies Natural (July 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at law.harvard.edu/programs/ames foundation/BLH~o7/SeippOxfordDraft.pdf.
x85. See TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE DIVIDE, supra note 184.
i86. See HOnwrrz, supra note 45; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 21.
187. Gutteridge supra note i, at 44.
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outcomes. Occasionally, courts used them to redress distributional
asymmetries. More often, through reasonableness rules, judges sought to
stir and govern economic growth, creating the conditions for the "release
of creative human energy."' 88 Rather than directly responding to the
entrepreneurial class's particularized demands, the functional
equivalents of abuse of rights may have played a more general facilitative
role. While belief in the facilitative potential of reasonableness and
malice rules was only one of a larger set of beliefs driving judges, it is
plausible to claim that it was an important one. "Reasonableness" and
"malice" were among the legal tools affirmatively deployed to create a
legal framework for economic change. Easily maneuverable, they
allowed courts to expand or restrict at need the range of reasonable, and
hence lawful, social and economic "uses" or "activities." The facilitative
role played by these rules is not to obscure their ideological function. As
suggested earlier, emphasis on shared socioethical standards of
"reasonableness" helped justify and naturalize changing notions of
"permitted" uses of property, "legal" organized labor activity, and
"lawful" business competition, ultimately precluding alternative
arrangements and different distributive outcomes.'
The relationship between doctrinal developments in water law-
most notably the shift from the "natural flow" rule to the "reasonable
user" standard-and economic growth has been discussed at length.
Some have posited a direct relation.'" Reasonableness tests allowed
courts to balance the relative efficiency of conflicting uses of water,
effectively promoting newer economically valuable uses and sweeping
away established and less remunerative uses. Others have challenged the
thesis of a direct influence, claiming that, for all their talk of balancing,
courts rarely denied relief to an established user whose interests were
interfered with by a newcomer.'9' These critics focused on nonutilitarian
elements in riparian water law.9 2 While the language of reasonableness
might be taken to suggest that courts tended to privilege more valuable
uses and hence divest the old, this was not the case. Only in cases of
flagrantly wasteful use did courts wipe out an established use.' 93 Further,
the argument runs, especially in the Western regions of the country,
courts bent the reasonable user doctrine to achieve outcomes that did
not necessarily favor new economically profitable uses of water."
188. JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES 5-6 (1956).
i89. See discussion supra Part I.A.i-4.
90. HORWnz, supra note 45, at 34-35.
191. Stephen F. Williams, Transforming American Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful
History, 25 UCLA L. REV. I1I87, I1I97-98 (1978).
592. Id. at 1204.




However, while actual divestment of established users might be less
frequent than broadly assumed, judicial opinions show that courts were
well aware of the potential of reasonableness rules for fostering
economic growth and were often keenly oriented towards such end. In a
large number of cases the conflicting rights of riparian owners were
balanced with a bias towards dynamic and productive property.' In Cary
v. Daniels, Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
neatly enunciated the productivity rationale of the new rule:
But one of the beneficial uses of a watercourse, and in this country one
of the most important, is its application to the working of mills and
machinery; a use profitable to the owner, and beneficial to the public.
It is therefore held, that each proprietor is entitled to such use of the
stream, so far as it is reasonable, conformable to the usages and wants
of the community, and having regard to the progress of improvement
in hydraulic works, and not inconsistent with a like reasonable use by
the other proprietors of land ... .6
As his biographer notes, Justice Shaw's words suggest that, at the
time when "older rural agrarian-merchant society was evolving [into] a
complex industrial one," the reasonable user rule appeared to him as an
effective trigger for economic development.'97 Rhetorically, the allusion
to the conditions and needs of the country and to the interest of the
community struck a critical chord in a society where energy and
dynamism, particularly in the realm of the economy, were dominant
values.
Similar developmental concerns permeate the court's reasoning in
Wheatley v. Baugh." Chief Justice Lewis held the defendant, a mining
company, was not liable for reducing the flow of the subterranean spring
which fed the machines of the plaintiff, a neighboring tannery.'" The
defendant, Lewis suggested, was not animated by malice but by the
reasonable purpose of working his coal mine." Replete with references
to continental theories of abuse of rights, the opinion illustrates Lewis's
favor for valuable economic activities such as mining. Lewis marshaled
an absolutist notion of property rights of continental flavor in support of
developmental considerations:
In conducting extensive mining operations, it is in general impossible
to preserve the flow of the subterranean waters through the interstices
in which they have usually passed, and many springs must be
necessarily destroyed in order that the proprietors of valuable minerals
may enjoy their own. The public interest is greatly promoted by
protecting this right, and it is just that the imperfect rights and lesser
195. HORwrrz, supra note 45, at 31; HURST, supra note 188, at 24.
196. 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466, 476-77 (1844).
197. LEVY, supra note 129, at 22.
198. 25 Pa. 528 (1855).




advantage should give place to that which is perfect, and infinitely the
most beneficial to individuals and to the community in general."'
On the other hand, critics rightly point to the ambiguous persistence
of nonutilitarian concerns in courts' articulation of the new rule.i While
the maximization of growth and productivity were critical concerns
driving judges, occasionally "reasonable user" rules were deployed to
reach bold distributive outcomes."3 In Western states, the "correlative
rights" rule brought into sharp focus the notion of general welfare at the
expense of individual economic dynamism and new valuable uses of
water.2 4 Courts equated "reasonable use" with use on riparian land,
thereby severely limiting flexibility in water use.2 o5
For instance, in Katz v. Walkinshaw, the critical potential of the
reasonable use doctrine was fully exploited and the notion of a social
function of property, although not explicitly articulated, was alluded to.2o6
The defendant, who owned a lot of land in arid Southern California,
drained from his land with powerful pumps the underground water which
would have otherwise percolated to plaintiffs' land, feeding their artesian
well." The defendant diverted the water in order to sell it for the
irrigation of distant lands.208 The Supreme Court of California reversed
the decision of the lower court, which had ruled in favor of the
defendant.2 0 Considerations of public policy drove the court's
reasoning.2 0 Having profusely examined the impact of the reasonable use
rule in light of California's peculiar climatic situation, the court weighed
the profit of the individual owner against the interest of the community
at large.' "In short, the members of the community, in the case
201. Id. at 535.
202. See Williams, supra note 191.
203. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663, 663-64 (Cal. 1902).
204. Id.
205. Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 16 OR. L. REv. 203, 203 (1937); Samuel C. Wiel.
Theories of Water Law, 27 HARV. L. REV., 530,543 (1913-1914).
2o6. See Katz, 70 P. 663.
207. Id. at 663-64.
208. Id. at 664.
209. Id. at 669.
210. Id. at 668.
211. Id. at 665.
Such law as has been made upon the subject comes from countries and climates where water
is abundant, and its conservation and economical use of little consequence, as compared
with a climate like southern California. The learned counsel for appellants state in their
brief that water at San Bernardino is worth $i,ooo per inch of flow. Percolating water or
water held in the earth is the main source of supply for domestic uses and for irrigation,
without which most lands are unproductive.
Id.
But the maxim, 'Cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad inferos," furnishes a rule of easy
application, and saves a world of judicial worry in many cases. And perhaps in England and
in our Eastern states a more thorough and minute consideration of the equities of parties
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supposed, have a common interest in the water. It is necessary for all,
and it is an anomaly in the law if one person can for his individual profit
destroy the community, and render the neighborhood uninhabitable."212
A similar variety of results-and an analogous tension between the
promotion of economical uses of property and the protection of static
property-characterize nuisance cases involving questions of malice or
reasonableness. In dealing with disputes among residential neighbors,
courts relied upon malice rules and reasonableness tests to weigh
neighbors' respective rights to a peaceful enjoyment of their property,
favoring quiet habitation, agriculture, and other time-honored uses of the
land.
In Christie v. Davey, an 1892 English case, the Chancery Division
carefully examined the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, holding
that while the giving of musical lessons seventeen hours a week by a
music teacher did not constitute a nuisance, the annoying noises
produced by the teacher's neighbor as a malicious response did amount
to a nuisance to be restrained.' In an 1888 West Virginia case
concerning the troublesome cohabitation of two litigious families, the
court gauged the reasonableness of the defendant's right "to enjoy the
privileges of a home" and the plaintiffs' right "to security in their home,"
finding that the former had been exercised unreasonably and
maliciously.214 Conversely, in a Michigan case, the purpose for which the
right was exercised excused the defendant's conduct.2 " A shed used for
coal and wood, although spitefully erected by the defendant so as to shut
off some of the neighbor's light, was not considered a nuisance on
account of it serving a useful purpose."'
However, with the expansion of industry and the development of
steam-powered, coal-burning, and synthetic alkali technology, the
question of the reasonable use of property assumed a new dimension.
Effective in protecting landowners' quiet enjoyment of their "static"
property in cases involving disputes among residential neighbors,
may not often be required. The case is very different, however, in an arid country like
southern California, where the relative importance of percolating water and water flowing
in definite water courses is greatly changed.
Id. at 666.
212. Id. at 665.
213. (1892) I Ch. 316, 328-29.
214. Medford v. Levy, 8 S.E. 302, 306 (W. Va. 1888). The defendants' habit of opening the door
leading from the kitchen to the hall, thereby "filling the whole house with objectionable odors, owing
to the frequent cooking of cabbage, onions, and other things, the odor of which is particularly
nauseating" was deemed unreasonable in light of the plaintiff's wife suffering from a form of neuralgia
that made her "nervous and excitable" and hence peculiarly affected by the incidents of domestic
habits not conforming to those of "a neat and tidy housewife." Id. at 304.




reasonableness tests soon became a critical tool for protecting "dynamic"
property in cases pitting residential landowners against industrial
enterprises."' As the century progressed, conflicts between residential or
agricultural and industrial uses of land came to comprise a greater
portion of courts' dockets.2 "Reasonable user" tests allowed courts to
weigh exploitive and conservatory uses of land, often favoring the
former."' For the most part, production and manufacturing firms were
not found to abuse their rights over the land.220 In analyzing the
"reasonableness" of the use, courts focused on the economic context and
social utility of industrial activity.
Legal historians and social historians have debated at length the
relationship between developments in the law of nuisance and the
advancement of the Industrial Revolution in England. Some have
suggested that courts consciously established a new balance between
industrial uses and other uses, effectively emasculating the law of
nuisance as a useful curb on industrial pollution and leaving little room
for successful legal action by individuals and communities adversely
affected by it.2 2 1 Others have posited a looser relationship between
courts' articulation of nuisance and the needs and demands of nascent
big industry, pointing to a variety of institutional, procedural, and social
factors complicating too easy a deterministic account.2 The cost of
litigation, the difficulty of establishing cause and effect in the absence of
sophisticated scientific monitoring, the existence of private ordering as a
valid alternative to litigation, and, finally, the social exclusion of the
prime victims of industrialization-the urban working classes, to whom
legal action was largely unavailable-explain the weakness of the
common law of nuisance as a response to the adverse effects of
217. See, e.g., St Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) II Eng. Rep. 1483, 1485. See generally
Joel F. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974).
218. HORWITZ, supra note 45, at 37.
219. Id. at 40.
220. Id. at 41-42.
221. See Brenner, supra note 217, at 408. Brenner's thesis is that, "[u]ntil the very end of the
eighteenth century the view was strongly held by courts that in nuisance cases, unless the
inconvenience caused by a defendant's activity was trivial, liability would follow once the plaintiff had
established an interference with the use and enjoyment of his land." See John P. S. McLaren. Nuisance
Law and the Industrial Revolution-Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155.
169 (1983) (discussing Brenner's thesis). The predominant thought was that the plaintiff had a
preeminent claim to protection; the fact that the defendant had acted reasonably in the circumstances
or that her activity was of public utility was considered no defense. Id. With the advent of
industrialization, and the new relevance and frequency of conflicts between time-honored
conservatory uses of land and new exploitive industrial uses, courts' views changed. Id. After a period
of vacillation, the House of Lords compromised with industrial interests, emasculating the common
law of nuisance as a curb on air, noise, and water pollution. See generally id.; Brenner, supra note 217.
222. McLaren, supra note 221, at i56; see A. E. Dingle, "The Monster Nuisance of All":




industrialization. 23 And, overall, these observers note, "the body of
nuisance law which developed during the Industrial Revolution was
anything but monolithic in quality and could well have encouraged the
victim of industrial pollution, as it may have done the perpetrator."224
While the relation is a highly ambiguous and layered one, in a
significant number of cases, English courts relied on reasonableness tests
to tilt the balance between residential and industrial uses in favor of the
latter.' By the mid-nineteenth century, courts expanded the range of
factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of defendants'
use of the land, increasingly taking into account not only the modalities
of use but also the locality in which the contested use was carried out. In
Hole v. Barlow, the Court of Common Pleas found the defendant not
liable for erecting a brick kiln in front of his house and burning a large
quantity of bricks, thereby causing a noxious and unwholesome vapor
which invaded the plaintiff's house and garden.226 The court ruled that no
cause of action lies for the reasonable use of a lawful trade in a
convenient and proper place, even though someone may suffer
inconvenience.227 The court reported and approved the trial judge's
finding that
it is not every body whose enjoyment of life and property is rendered
uncomfortable by the carrying on of an offensive or noxious trade in
the neighbourhood, that can bring an action. If that were so,-as has
already been observed by the learned counsel for the defendant,-the
neighborhood of Birmingham and Wolverhampton and the other great
manufacturing towns of England would be full of persons bringing
actions for nuisances arising from the carrying on of noxious and
offensive trades in their vicinity, to the great injury of the
manufacturing and social interests of the community. I apprehend the
law to be this, that no action lies for the use, the reasonable use, of a
lawful trade in a convenient and proper place, even though some one
may suffer annoyance from its being so carried on."'
Judge Willes of the Court of Common Pleas neatly spelled out the
link between public interest and the needs of productivity:
The common-law right which every proprietor of a dwelling-house has
to have the air uncontaminated and unpolluted, is subject to this
qualification, that necessities may arise for an interference with that
right pro-bono publico, to this extent, that such interference be in
respect of a matter essential to the business of life, and be conducted in
223. See McLaren, supra note 221, at 190.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 170.
226. (i858) 140 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1113 (C.B).




a reasonable and proper manner, and in a reasonable and proper
place."'
A few years later, the House of Lords' decision in St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping,2 30 arguably the most important case of industrial
pollution of the era,231 made residential owners' "actions in respect of
discomfort virtually impossible in the industrial Midlands and in regions
such as Swansea and Cardiff." 32 The activity of the St. Helen's copper
smelting company caused large quantities of "noxious gases, vapours,
and other noxious matter," which diffused over the plaintiff's land,
damaging the vegetation and injuring the cattle.3 The House of Lords
upheld the Exchequer Chamber's decision that the company was liable
for any physical damage but not for the deterioration of the plaintiff's
comfort.2 34 When the cause was tried before Mr. Justice Mellor at
Liverpool in 1863, "[t]he Defendant's counsel submitted that the three
questions which ought to be left to the jury were, 'whether [the copper
smelting activity] was a necessary trade, whether the place was a suitable
place for such a trade, and whether it was carried on in a reasonable
manner."' 235 The opinion of the House of Lords focused on the
reasonableness of the locality. In Lord Cranworth's words: "You must
look at it not with a view to the question whether, abstractedly, that
quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a
person living in the town of Shields.. . . .36
A few paragraphs later, Lord Wensleydale neatly spelled out the
court's concerns that a more stringent articulation of the reasonableness
test would adversely impact national economic development:
The Defendants say, "If you do not mind you will stop the progress of
works of this description." I agree that it is so, because, no doubt, in
the county of Lancaster above all other counties, where great works
have been created and carried on, and are the means of developing the
national wealth, you must not stand on extreme rights and allow a
person to say, "I will bring an action against you for this and that, and
so on."237
Similarly, in the United States, in pollution cases, courts deployed
reasonableness tests with an eye toward economic growth, largely
disregarding the costs imposed on the victims of development (i.e.,
workers and residential owners). The impact of nineteenth-century tort
229. Id. at iiI18 (opinion of Willes, J.).
230. (1865) I Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L.).
231. See Brenner, supra note 217, at 413.
232. Id. at 413-14.
233. St Helen's Smelting Co., ii Eng. Rep. at 1483-.
234. Id. at 1485.
235. Id. at 1484.
236. Id. at 1487 (opinion of Lord Cranworth).
237. Id. (opinion of Lord Wensleydale).
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doctrine on the economy has been the object of a well-known debate. A
substantial body of scholarship has agreed, although with different
methodological and political nuances, on the view that courts
deliberately structured tort law to promote industrial expansion and
powerful economic interests by exempting corporate enterprises from
liability for the harm caused by their activity.238 In its most controversial
formulation, this thesis claims that the doctrinal development of tort law
translated into a "subsidy" to the rising entrepreneurial class. This
"subsidy" was coerced from the victims of economic growth and,
ultimately, it increased the inequalities of wealth and power in
nineteenth-century America.239 Others have objected that, depending on
the industrial sector, the latter thesis is either irrelevant or false.240
Generally speaking, these critics note that evidence of utilitarian or
growth-driven judicial reasoning is scant.24' Further, records show that
the "negligence system was applied with impressive sternness to major
industries and that [courts] exhibited a keen concern for victim
welfare."2 42 While a critical appraisal of the debate is largely beyond the
scope of this Article, a glance at air and water pollution cases seems to
add evidence in support of the "maximization of economic growth"
thesis.
238. This view has been variously articulated, reflecting different methodological approaches and
political positions. For example, Hurst argued that the development of nineteenth-century American
private law promoted economic growth in that it was shaped by a variety of economic, social,
geographical, and technological needs. See HURST, supra note 188. More specifically, it reflected: (s)
the needs of emerging industry, (2) a broad consensus among the various social groups on a set of
shared values, and (3) above all, "the release of individual creative human energy." Id. at 5. These
economic and social factors shaped private law, and tort law in particular, in the sense that they
exerted "pressure" on law. Hurst assumed a complex notion of historical causation and distinguished
between three types of such "pressure": focused pressure, functional pressure, and inertia. See id.
Friedman provides a more deterministic and materialist account of the development of nineteenth-
century tort law. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). The contours of
American nineteenth-century tort law, Friedman argues, are "molded by economy and society," by the
interplay of plural pressure groups motivated primarily by economic interests -an interplay where the
capitalist-entrepreneurs are the winning group. See id. at 350. However, the most well-known and
controversial formulation of the thesis is due to Horwitz, who argued that in the nineteenth century,
courts working in concert with big economic interests effected a revolution in tort law, that from strict
liability to negligence, promoted industrialization by exempting corporate enterprises from liability for
the harm caused by their activity. See HORWITZ, supra note 45. This doctrinal shift translated into a
subsidy to the entrepreneurial class, coerced from the very victims of industrialization. Id.
239. HORWITz, supra note 45.
240. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719-20 (1981).
241. Others have placed emphasis on other factors, such as the litigation costs, that, along with the
judiciary's ideology and its conscious objectives in shaping tort doctrine, explain tort law's weak
response to industrial pollution at the moment of industrialization. See generally Keith N. Hylton,
Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. III (1991); McLaren,
supra note 223.
242. Schwartz. supra note 240, at 1720.
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More specifically, studies of pollution nuisance cases in states which
were early bloomers in nineteenth-century American industrialization -
such as Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey-have shown that
courts usually deployed balancing tests to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief
or damages.243 In weighing the right of defendant industries against that
of pollution victims, courts were inclined to emphasize the
reasonableness of the former's use and to overstate the ruinous impact
that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would exert on economic life.
Courts' judgments of reasonableness portray a constant preoccupation
with economic growth and a tendency toward "domino-effect" thinking.
Typically, a judgment granting injunctive or damage relief was seen as
starting a parade of horrific effects, from the termination of all coke
manufacturing in Pennsylvania, to the automatic stifling of all industrial
development in the state, to the decline of industrial cities and the
deprivation of the benefits of urban life. 2"
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, the last episode of a protracted
dispute among residential owners and a coal mining company, is
exemplary of courts' attitudes.245 The defendant, the Pennsylvania Coal
Company, released large volumes of mine water into the stream flowing
through the Sandersons' land, thereby polluting the water to such an
extent as to render it totally unfit for domestic or agricultural purposes."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not find the defendant to have
abused its property rights, declining to award damages to the
Sandersons.247 In the court's analysis, "reasonable use" was equated with
"ordinary and natural use.""M The defendant, the court asserted, being
the owners of a lot of coal land, had the right to the "natural use and
enjoyment" of their property.249 Since coal mining in the ordinary and
usual form is the "natural use" of coal land, the court concluded that any
damage resulting from such natural use is, in the absence of negligence
or malice, damnum absque injuria.2 so Developmental concerns were key
to the court's notion of "reasonableness." Justice Clark profusely
examined the dimensions and the social utility of coal mining in
Pennsylvania's economy:
243. Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of Pollution Abatement Across Time and
Place: Balancing Doctrine in Pollution Nuisance Law, 184o-19o6, II LAW & HisT. REv. 303, 313-14
('993).
244. Id. at 3 18-20.
245. 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886). For an extensive discussion of the Sanderson case, see Bone, supra note
22, at i 160-70.
246. Sanderson, 6 A. at 454.
247. Id. at 464-65.
248. Id. at 456.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 457.
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It has been stated that 30,000,000 of tons of anthracite and
70,000,000 of bituminous coal are annually produced in Pennsylvania.
It is therefore a question of vast importance, and cannot, on that
account, be too carefully considered .... Indeed, if the right to
damages in such cases is admitted, equity may, and under the decisions
of this court undoubtedly would, at the suit of any riparian owner, take
jurisdiction, and, upon the ground of a continuous and irreparable
injury, enjoin the operation of the mine altogether.25 '
A few years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania embarked on
a bolder argumentation. In Robb v. Carnegie Bros., the plaintiff brought
an action against a coal company to recover damages for injury to his
farm caused by the smoke and gas from the coke ovens erected on the
adjoining land.2 52 The defendants relied on Sanderson to claim that the
alleged injuries did not entitle the plaintiff to recover, since they were the
natural and necessary consequence of a reasonable use of the
defendants' property." The court distinguished the case from Sanderson:
Since the land in question was not coal land, the court reasoned that the
injury resulted from the defendants' decision to devote their land to the
burning of coal mined elsewhere, rather than from the natural use of
their land.254 However, Justice Williams found the selection of the
location reasonable and proper."' The court's discussion of the measure
of the damages illustrates its developmental concerns:
The plaintiff's farm is in a region in which bituminous coal is obtained
in large quantities. He himself mines coal upon his own land for sale.
The conversion of coal into coke to supply fuel for the great iron and
steel mills of western Pennsylvania is one of the great industries of the
region. Many millions of money are invested in, and many thousands of
men are employed about, its production. It has been largely
251. Id. at 455. Similarly, in the Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, io8 (1872), the court reversed
the decision of the lower court, which had issued an injunction preventing the defendant from burning
bricks, thereby causing injury and annoyance to the plaintiff. The defendant's use of his land, the court
asserted, was a reasonable one, the land having upon it a deposit of fine brick clay which could be
made into bricks for profit if this was done near the pit form which the clay was taken. Id. at io6. In
Doellner v. Tynan, 38 How. Pr. 176, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869), the court found that the defendant
exercised his business of blacksmithing reasonably and refused to grant an injunction. Quoting an
earlier English case, the court noted that an action "does not lie for a reasonable use of my right,
though it be of annoyance of another. Id. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' mijury as mere annoyance
and noted the usefulness of the blacksmith trade in urban life. Id. at *6. In Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa.
274, 285, 289 (1868), the defendants owned a mill that produced shavings, chips, and saw dust. The
material used in it was highly flammable, rendering it dangerous to buildings in the vicinity. Id. In May
1866 the mill burned, injuring many houses in the neighborhood. Id. The plaintiffs sought to prevent
the defendants from rebuilding the mill. Id. Chief Justice Thompson conceded that the species of
property in question was extra-hazardous, but claimed that if carried on reasonably, the business could
not be a nuisance. Id. Justice Thompson discussed at length the benefits and the problems of modern
urban life. Id.
252. 22 A. 649, 650 (Pa. 1891).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 650-51.
255. Id. at 651-
February 2o1o] 729
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
instrumental in the development, growth, and general prosperity of the
region. The plaintiff shares the general benefits . . . of these works
near him .... These considerations should be borne in mind in
adjusting the damages, if any have been sustained... a256
Economic preoccupations also pervade opinions dealing with
instances of malicious interference with contractual relations. Loaded
with distributive implications, this relatively new tort raised critical
questions as to the role and scope of market competition. Most instances
of interference involved employment contracts or sales contracts, thereby
calling upon courts to define the proper and reasonable limits of the right
to compete in business life or in the labor market. As Prosser's treatise
on the law of torts notes, "in this field, perhaps more obviously than any
other, the problem has continuously been one of adjustment of the
conflicting claims of different enterprises, industries, classes and groups,
where interests are nicely balanced, and decisions on the basis of social
policy is not an easy matter." 57
In cases involving business competition, reasonableness tests and
malice rules were useful for governing and for stirring economic life
because they limited the sphere of fair and permissible market
competition. In Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., the Supreme Court of Iowa
struggled with the perplexities arising "in the effort to sustain, on the one
hand, the widest practicable liberty of men to engage in any and every
line of business, and, on the other, to protect the business of each from
wrongful encroachment or interference by others."258 The plaintiff, who
sold oil from tank wagons driven about the streets, used to leave green
cards with customers to display in their windows when in need of oil.259
The defendant, a former wholesale supplier of the plaintiff seeking
revenge upon the latter, entered the retail business trying to sell his oil
wherever the plaintiff's green cards were exposed.' The court found that
the defendant had transgressed the bounds of legitimate competition.261
While the defendant, the court conceded, had the right to establish a
retail oil business and to send its agents over the same routes covered by
the plaintiff, defendant ought to have exercised such right reasonably
and without malice.2 62 The court expressed its view as to the perversions
of unbound competition: "The laws of competition in business are harsh
enough; the rule that motive is irrelevant would lead to pernicious
256. Id. at 653.
257. PROSSER, supra note 86, at 927.
258. 132 N.W. 371, 374 (Iowa 1911).
259. Id. at 372.
260. Id.
261. Id
262. Id. at 374.
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consequences, justifying the worst wrongs upon the theory that 'it is
business.'""' Fortunately, Justice Weaver added:
there has for many years been a distinct and growing tendency of the
courts to look beneath the letter of the law and give some effect to its
beneficent spirit, thereby preventing the perversion of the rules
intended for the protection of human rights into engines of oppression
and wrong. 64
Justice Weaver's bold social language should not deceive. The
functional equivalents of abuse of rights left largely untouched, and
ultimately strengthened, the pervasive individualistic vocabulary of
"rights" and "property." In justifying the protection granted to the
victims of the interference, courts resorted to the theory of "contractual
property.""26 Contracts were conceptualized as a form of intangible
property to be protected.26 6 In Jones v. Leslie, the Supreme Court of
Washington deployed a subjective notion of malice, defined as wanton
malevolence, to protect the weaker contractual party.t Significantly,
however, the court's effort to "correct" the balance of power between
the stronger party (the former employer), and the weaker party (the
employee seeking a better job), was not paralleled by a "correction" of
the individualistic notion of "contractual property." Rather, the court
profusely articulated the property rationale underlying the protection of
employment relations from malicious interference:
It would be well to remember in the beginning that it is fundamental
that a man has a right to be protected in his property. This was the
doctrine of the common law, is, and always has been the law in every
civilized nation. It is of necessity one of the fundamental principles of
government, the protection of property being largely one of the objects
of government.... Is, then, the right of employment in a laboring man
property? That it is we think cannot be questioned. The property of the
capitalist is his gold and silver, his bonds, credit, etc., for in these he
deals and makes his living. For the same reason, the property of the
merchant is his goods. And every man's trade or profession is his
property, because it is his means of livelihood, because, through its
agency, he maintains himself and family, and he is enabled to add his
share towards the expenses of maintaining the government.... To
destroy this property, or to prevent one from contracting it or
exchanging it for the necessities of life, is not only an invasion of a
private right, but is an injury to the public, for it tends to produce
pauperism and crime."'
263. Id. at 372.
264. Id.
265. Note, supra note 83, at 1511.
266. See id.; see also Jones v. Leslie, II2 P. 8j, 84 (Wash. i9bo); Huskie v. Griffin, 74 A. 595 (N.H.
1909).
267. Ix2zP.at 84.
268. Id. at 82.
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Similarly, in Huskie v. Griffin, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire's decision to afford protection to the weaker party was
couched in the language of ample and equal individual freedom rather
than in that of solidarity and social duties.2 The issue presented, the
court noted, was "that of the existence and extent of what has come to be
known as the right to an 'open market,"' a right "inherent in the idea of
Anglo-Saxon liberty."2 0 Far from being an absolute right, the right to an
open market is to be exercised with respect to the equal rights of others.
How far one may lawfully interfere to prevent the making of contracts
between third parties depends upon a reasonableness test that takes into
account the motive of the defendant as well as the circumstances.
With the intensification of labor upheaval in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the tort of interference with contractual relations
became critical to the struggle between labor unions and capitalist
employers. As in cases of business competition, courts relied on
standards of "reasonableness" or "malice" to define the compass of
legitimate labor competition. However, when dealing with episodes of
union interference with employment relations, courts' commitment to
ensuring fairness and to protecting weaker contractual parties often
translated into an effort at stifling unions' energetic activism.
A prolific literature has shed light on the powerful attack mounted
against organized labor by courts alarmed by the economic power of
nationally organized trade unions and state federations.27 2 The
burgeoning of new types of collective action, such as secondary boycotts,
sympathy strikes, and recognition strikes, called for a prompt legal
response.' The doctrine of "malice" was part of such response. A study
of the reorientation of labor law between 1886 and 1895 has shown that
the concept of "malice" proved critical to constraining labor's ability to
use concerted action. 274 The interloper union was often found to have
269. 74 A. 595.
270. Id. at 596-97.
271. Id. at 598 ("One may not interfere with his neighbor's open market or 'reasonable
expectancies' solely for the purpose of doing harm. It has been said, however, in several cases that a
wrongful motive cannot convert a legal act into an illegal one, and many judges have thought this was
the end of the law upon the question. They seem to proceed upon a theory of absolute right in the
defendant... .[The right] is a qualified one, and the rightfulness of its exercise depends upon all those
elements which go to make up a cause for human action. The reasonableness of the act cannot always
be satisfactorily determined until something is known of the state of the actor's mind. The 'justification
may be found sometimes in the circumstances under which it is done, irrespective of motive,
sometimes in the motive alone, and sometimes in the circumstances and motive combined." (quoting
Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 101, 1014 (Mass. 1900)).
272. See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHrs To
CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 1993) (3989).
273. FORBATH, supra note 272.
274. Hurvitz, supra note 122, at 33 1-33.
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acted maliciously rather than in the pursuit of free competition."' In a
similar vein, an analysis of late-nineteenth-century labor decisions in
Massachusetts and Illinois has described how courts consistently relied
on a circular, and apparently neutral, notion of "malice" to assert unions'
rights in the abstract while negating them in practice.276 Judges
"refer[red] to the actions of unions as 'malicious' as if that was a finding
of fact, in order to support a legal conclusion that the union's actions
were not legally justified."7
A widely known case of obstruction and interference with
employment relations, Walker v. Cronin, exemplifies the use of "malice"
to curb labor's action.27 The defendant union agent, in order to compel a
shoe manufacturer to agree on higher wages, had persuaded a large
number of the latter's actual and prospective employees to abandon their
jobs.279 The employer, who as a consequence of the union's action had
difficulties recruiting other skilled workmen and had to pay higher
wages, brought an action for damages." The question around which the
case revolved was whether the defendant union had maliciously
exercised its right to freely compete for better conditions.'i The court
refused to see the controversy as an instance of competition between
labor and capital and fit the case into the template of subjective "malice."
The defendant's efforts to induce the shoemakers to abandon their jobs
were seen as being driven by the arbitrary and malicious purpose of
causing disturbance and economic loss rather than as instrumental to
broader labor objectives."' The court concluded:
Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own
enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be protected
against competition; but he has a right to be free from malicious and
wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss
come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others,
it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or
otherwise is interfered with. But if come from the merely wanton or
malicious acts of others, without the justification of competition or the
service of any interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a different
footing, and falls within the principle of the authorities first referred to
[the suggestion in Greenleaf v. Francis that malicious acts without the
275. Id.
276. Ellen M. Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism: How Legal Logic Shaped and
Vitiated the Rights of American Workers, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. I, 32 (1983).
277. Id.
278. 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
279. Id. at 556-57.
280. Id. at 557.
281. See id. at 564.
282. See id. at 559.
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justification of any right, that is, acts of a stranger, resulting in like loss
or damage, might be actionable]."
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
examined the reasonableness of the means employed by the
defendants.284 The court found them to fall outside the compass of
permissible competition, which amounted to an unlawful combination to
injure the employer.28 5 The case involved episodes of picketing,
obstruction, and intimidation in front of the employer's factory on the
part of workers seeking to obtain higher wages and shorter time
schedules.286 The employer filed a bill for an injunction restraining the
workers from picketing and obstructing.2'8' Again, the critical question
was whether the defendants had maliciously exercised their right to
freely communicate in a public space-the sidewalk in front of the
employer's premises-to improve their labor conditions." Justice Allen
examined the reasonableness of the defendants' purpose and activity and
granted an injunction:
The defendants contend that these acts were justifiable, because
they were only seeking to secure better wages for themselves, by
compelling the plaintiff to accept their schedule of wages. This motive
or purpose does not justify maintaining a patrol in front of plaintiffs
premises, as a means of carrying out their conspiracy. A combination
among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within
allowable competition, and is lawful, although others may be indirectly
affected thereby. But a combination to do injurious acts expressly
directed to another, by way of intimidation or constraint, either of
himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him, is
outside of allowable competition, and is unlawful."
In his widely quoted dissent, Justice Holmes investigated the
possible malicious nature of the defendants' combination, and he
reached the opposite conclusion.7' While an individual has an undeniable
right to freely communicate in order to better her position, a collective
exercise of such right, entailing a higher degree of pressure and
disruption, might be deemed an unreasonable, malicious, and unjustified
exercise of the right.29' However, Justice Holmes noted, "free
competition means combination, and that the organization of the world,
283. Id. at 564.
284. 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (Mass. 1896) (finding defendants interfered with right to "engage all
persons who are willing to work for him, at such prices as may be mutually agreed upon" and with the
other actual or prospective employees' right to "enter into or remain in the employment of any person
or corporation willing to employ them").
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1078.
288. This was later held to he free speech. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U.S. 88. Io1-o3 (1940).
289. Vegelahn, 44N.E. at 5077-78.




now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and scope of
combination."292
When the notion of subjective malice or the inquiry into the
reasonableness of the means did not help, courts resorted to rigid and
pre-fixed notions of reasonable and legitimate purpose as a restrictive,
and apparently neutral, yardstick for assessing the objectives sought by
unions. As discussed earlier, in Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, the
court analyzed the immediate motive driving the defendant union and
found it to be that of "showing to the building world what punishment
and disaster necessarily followed a defiance of their demands."'9 Justice
Taft concluded that the defendant's purpose, when assessed in light of
the "normal operation of the right to labor" (i.e., the securing of
worker's wages and employment terms), appeared malicious.Such a
purpose, Justice Taft concluded, if assessed in light of the "normal
operation of the right to labor," defined as the securing of workers'
wages and terms of employment, appears malicious.' Justice Taft's
opinion is riddled with anxiety. Boycotts, a new and effective form of
organized action, spurred alarm among judges and lawyers. Labor
historians have investigated the different modalities of capital's response.
Some have told the story of the American Anti-Boycott Association,
examining the efforts of proprietary capitalists to organize and lobby
against labor.2 95 Others have analyzed the imaginative metaphorical
language developed by judges to deal with boycott cases.296 Abuse,
malice, and unreasonableness were central to this vocabulary,
emphasizing labor's irresponsible and tyrannical exercise of its rights. As
Justice Carpenter noted in State v. Glidden:
If a large body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside
of law, over and above law, it is not to be expected that they will be
satisfied with a moderate and reasonable use of it. All history proves
that abuses and excesses are inevitable. The exercise of irresponsible
power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers, creates an
unappeasable appetite for more.297
Although less inventive than Justice Carpenter, Justice Taft must
have shared these fears and, towards the end of his opinion, quoting an
earlier case, described boycotts as "oppressive to the individual, injurious
292. Id. at xo81.
293. 1o Ohio Dec. Reprint 665, 673 (1889).
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., ERNST, supra note 272.
296. See, e., GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE
LEGAL MIND (1999).
297. 8 A. 890, 894 (Conn. 1887)-
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to the prosperity of the community, and subversive of the peace and
good order of society."298
Did the equivalents of abuse of rights operate as dangerous "social
drugs" exerting potent after-effects? The cases discussed above indicate
that malice rules and reasonableness tests were thought to perform a
powerful role in facilitating and governing economic growth. Rather than
being consistently deployed to redress distributive asymmetries, as the
rhetoric surrounding abuse of rights suggests, the abuse of rights
equivalents were used to allocate and shift roles and costs between the
various actors of the nineteenth century's blooming economic
development: developers of land and large "static" landowners,
industrial enterprisers and smaller residential owners, capitalist
employers and organized labor. While not necessarily single-mindedly
and systematically used to subsidize the "interests" at the expense of the
weaker social strata, standards of "malice" and "reasonableness" were
largely deployed to facilitate the needs of the more dynamic and
economic actors. Of course, as observers have noted, concern for
economic development was only one element of a larger set of beliefs
that determined judges' reliance on "malice" and "reasonableness,"
beliefs about the principles of legal reasoning, about the nature of rights
and the value of property.299
II. COMMON LAWYERS DEBATING MALICE AND THE THEORY OF
"INTENTIONAL TORT"
The frequent deployment by English and American courts of
functional equivalents of "abuse of rights" raises the question of the
place of the latter in the scholarly debate. The absence of a unitary
concept of "abuse of rights" in the common law may be taken to suggest
that, while on the Continent a heated controversy pitted proponents
against critics of the doctrine, Anglo-American legal scholarship showed
tepid interest for the continental quenelle. However, this does not seem
to be the case.
Continental theories of "abuse of rights" were well-known and
profusely reviewed. In his 1905 disquisition on the relevance of wrongful
motive in tort liability, James Barr Ames corroborated his analysis with
continental examples, examining French and Belgian decisions along
with American and English cases." Similarly, in the 19io issue of the
Harvard Law Review, F. P. Walton of McGill University accurately laid
out the main positions in the French debate, contrasting the different
298. Moores & Co., Ohio Dec. Reprint at 675 (quoting Crump v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E. 620 (Va.
i888)).
299. See Bone, supra note 22.
300. Ames, supra note 72, at 457.
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articulations of the doctrine by Josserand, Saleilles, Charmont, and
Esmein &'
Further, "malice" was at the center of a vibrant transatlantic
conversation. Michael Taggart suggests in his study of Bradford v.
Pickles that for a twenty-year period spanning the turn of the twentieth
century, the place of "malice" in the law of torts was "a fashionable topic
of conversation on both sides of the Atlantic, at a time when British and
American lawyers spoke much the same language and listened to one
another." 30 2 The conversation took place in the pages of the Harvard Law
Review, the American Law Register, and the Law Quarterly Review
between the 188os and the 1920S. Henry Terry, Frederick Pollock, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, William Draper Lewis, James Barr Ames, Bruce
Wyman, and Ernst Huffcut were the participants. The conversation
developed along lines similar to those of the continental debate on abuse
of rights. Similar methodological and political questions were raised. At
stake were the organization of the conceptually haphazard law of torts,
the development of a new mode of legal thought (as an alternative to
Classical Legal Thought), and, ultimately, the choice between competing
models of socioeconomic governance.
The question of malice was, in the first place, a matter of clear
analytical reasoning. The actual significance of the question of "malice"
could only be elucidated through a reorganization of the conceptual
structure of the law of torts. The abolition of the modern common law
forms of action in the mid-nineteenth century confronted American
jurists with the problem of organizing the various forms of civil liability
in a unitary conceptual scheme. Henry Terry, Frederick Pollock, and
Oliver Wendell Holmes struggled to draw an analytically clear map of
the law of torts that would dispel the fog of empty abstractions that had
long obfuscated the problem of malice, bringing to light its real nature.
The maps they sketched contributed to the refutation of one of the
central tenets of classical legal science (i.e., the proposition that
individuals exercise their rights, absolute within their spheres, so as not
to injure the equal rights of others). Rather, they argued that there are
instances in which individuals are permitted to exercise their rights
maliciously or unreasonably, even if others are injured. The question of
"malice" is the question of defining these instances and is, ultimately, a
question of policy.
301. F. P. Walton, Motive as an Element of Torts in the Civil Law and in the Common Law, 22
HARV. L. REV. 501,502 (1909).
302. TAGGART, supra note 38, at 167; see RiCHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN
ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 187o-193o (1987). The formation of a community dedicated to
the celebration of the common law for its unifying force dated from about 3870, reached a zenith of
influence in the years before world War I, and then declined until about 1930, when it ceased to
attract loyalty on either side of the Atlantic. See id.; TAGGART, supra note 38.
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In an article on malicious torts published in 1884, Henry Terry
integrated malice in a conceptual scheme that reflected the most
sophisticated analytical tradition." Terry's scheme sought to show that
there is a general duty not to act maliciously that is subject to exceptions
motivated by reasons of policy and justice."A Rather than questions about
the nature of malice, malicious torts raise crucial questions regarding the
possibility of admitting exceptions to the general duty to refrain from
malicious acts. These questions are not to be decided by deduction from
an abstract notion of malice; instead, the answers depend on broad
considerations of justice and policy.
The widespread misapprehension of the problem of malice, Terry
noted, arises from a lack of clear views about certain elementary legal
ideas and their relation to each other.3 5 By tracing a clear analytical
scheme of legal ideas, Terry sought to disentangle the different kinds of
questions posed by malicious torts, clarifying the actual role played by
malice. He outlined a threefold classification of legal duties:yeremptory
duties, duties of reasonableness, and duties of intention. Duties of
intention include both duties not to act with a mere intention to produce
a certain result, which may be broken without malice, and duties not to
act maliciously, in the breach of which malice is essential." Malice means
an intention to cause harm or damage to another, the harm or damage as
such being the very thing desired.308
Further, Terry distinguished between two types of rights."
Permissive rights are liberties to act or to refrain from acting. However,
there is no corresponding duty on others not to interfere with permissive
rights.3"0 Protected rights, on the other hand, describe the legal condition
of a person for whom the law protects a condition of fact by imposing
duties on others.3 ' The protected condition of fact is the content of the
right, any impairment of such condition amounting to a violation of the
right. Terry delineated several classes of protected rights (i.e., rights of
personal security, rights in the persons of others, normal property rights,
abnormal property rights, and rights of pecuniary condition) each
displaying different features and corresponding to different duties.312 In
rights of pecuniary condition the protected condition of fact is the
holding of value or purchasing power in some form.
303. Henry T. Terry, Malicious Torts, 2o LAW Q. REV. I0 (1904).
304. Id at 10-12.
305. Id. at 1o.
306. Id at iI.
307. Id. at II-12.
308. Id. at 12.
309. Id. at 12-13.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 33-14-
332. Id. at 14-35.
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Having laid out this table of elementary legal ideas, Terry confined
the relevance of malice to a specific hypothesis. An actual question of
malice, he noted, arises in case of breach of a duty not to act maliciously
followed, as its proximate consequence, by the violation of a
corresponding right of pecuniary condition.1
When it appears that there has been a violation of the right of
pecuniary condition and of no other right, and the case is not one of
fraud, then the duty which must be proved to have been broken will
usually be a duty not to act maliciously, malice will be an essential
element in the cause of action, and the questions will arise, what is
malice? and what is the legal duty as to malicious conduct?"
However, even in this hypothesis, Terry added, malice might be
irrelevant, the question being whether there is any exception to that
duty."' There may be good reasons why a particular class of cases should
be excepted out of the general rule; the applicability of these exceptions
"is to be decided upon grounds of justice or policy special to each class of
cases."36
To sum up: when malice is alleged, the question maybe be any of the
following[:] . . . . If there has been a malicious act and thus prima facie
a breach of the last named duty, whether there is any exception to that
duty that covers the case. This depends not on any theory of malice,
but on considerations of justice and policy."
A decade later, the appearance of Holmes's article Privilege, Malice
and Intent marked a shift in the conceptualization of malice."' Holmes's
conceptualization of malice further developed Terry's idea that, in
certain cases, policy reasons suggest that malicious acts may be done
without the actor being liable. However, Holmes took Terry's scheme
one step further, developing a general theory of intentional tort in which
malice was purged of any moral connotation and equated with "the
absence of just cause or excuse. 3 9 Holmes's scheme proved extremely
influential, setting the terms of a transatlantic conversation between
Frederick Pollock and the Americans.
Privilege, Malice and Intent represents the final stage in the shaping
of a new conceptual structure of tort law; Holmes altered and refined his
earlier conceptual scheme of tort law by according malice a central role.
Holmes's earlier efforts were directed at anchoring liability to an
external objective standard, ultimately dependent on policy
considerations, rather than to an internal subjective standard based on
313. Id. at 15.
314. Id. at 20.
315. See id. at 23-24.
386. Id. atz24.
317. Id. at 26.
388. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. I(1894).
389. Id. at 3.
February 20Io] 739
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fault.320 The general purpose of the law of torts, Holmes argued, is to
secure a man against certain forms of harm, not because they are wrong
but because they are harms.32' The preoccupation with articulating an
objective, policy-based theory of liability induced Holmes to arrange
different types of torts in a "philosophically continuous series," running
from intentional torts to negligent torts to strict liability.322 The
continuum was organized according to the degree of foreseeability of the
harm, rather than on any subjective notion of fault.' For this scheme to
hold, the role of malice was to be eclipsed. Malice was deemed to be a
comparatively insignificant form of liability, circumscribed to isolated
instances. Malicious torts were assimilated into the broader category of
intentional torts. Holmes noted that there were certain harmful acts
which may be done even with malevolent intent.
[A man] may establish himself in business where he foresees that the
effect of his competition will be to diminish the custom of another
shopkeeper, perhaps to ruin him. He may erect a building which cuts
another off from a beautiful prospect, or he may drain subterranean
waters and thereby drain another's well; and many other case may be
put.324
Privileged malicious acts and strict liability functioned as the two
extremes that proved the irrelevance of any subjective moral standard of
liability:
As the law, on the one hand, allows certain harms to be inflicted
irrespective of the moral condition of him who inflicts them, so, at the
other extreme, it may on grounds of policy throw the absolute risk of
certain transactions on the person engaging in them, irrespective of
blameworthiness in any sense.2
The echo of Holmes's scheme was heard on the other side of the
Atlantic. In 1887, setting out to show that "there is really a Law of Torts,
not merely a number of rules about various kinds of torts," Frederick
Pollock acknowledged his debt to Holmes, warning him that "[y]ou will
recognize in my armoury some weapons of your own forging. 132 6
Pollock's distinction between causes of action based on intentional
conduct, negligent conduct, and strict liability mirrored Holmes's
327continuum. Further, similar to Terry and Holmes, he emphasized the
range of situations in which injury is legally permitted without
320. Id.; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652 (1873) [hereinafter
Holmes, Theory of Torts]; see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-163 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW].
321. Holmes, Theory of Torts, supra note 320, at 652-55
322. Id. at 654.
323. Id. at 653.
324. HOLMES, COMMON LAw, supra note 320. at 144-45.
325. Id. at 345.
326. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS, at Vii (3887).
327. Id. at 7-17.
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compensation."' Pollock pointed to trade competition and the
interception of water as instances in which "the exercise of ordinary
rights for a lawful purpose and in a lawful manner is no wrong even if it
causes damages."329 As to the role of malice, Pollock noted that, while in
Roman law the exercise of a right accompanied by a malicious intent is
ground for an action, there is no positive English authority on the
matter.330
By the 189os, Holmes had revised his conceptual structure of tort
law, hanging it on intentional torts and according malice central
relevance by linking it to the question of justification. The new
arrangement was neatly spelled out in Privilege, Malice and Intent. 33
Acknowledging that the objective test of the degree of manifest danger
does not exhaust the theory of torts, Holmes shifted the focus from the
external objective standard of liability to the assessment of the subjective
state of mind. Malice gained new centrality. In some cases, Holmes
noted, the actor is not liable for a very manifest danger unless he actually
intends to do the harm; in other cases actual malice may render the actor
liable, when, in the absence of it, she would have not incurred liability;
still in other cases, the actor may even intend to do the harm and yet not
have to answer for it.332 "[T]he intentional infliction of temporal damage,
or the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and
inflicting it, is actionable if done without just cause."333 When acting with
just cause, the actor is privileged to inflict the damage.334 Motive affects
claims of privilege.3 Actual malice or improper motive is a crucial factor
in weighing the defendant's justification. While a good motive justifies
the intentional infliction of harm, a bad motive may render the actor
liable. The question of justification, Holmes warned, ultimately rests on
delicate considerations of policy, rather than on empty logical
deductions.336 Two years later, in his famous dissent in Vegelhan v.
Guntner, Holmes restated the gist of the problem of malice.337 In
countless instances, Holmes noted, "the law warrants the intentional
infliction of temporal damages because it regards it justified."3,8 The true
grounds of justification, he continued, "are considerations of policy and
328. See id. at 21-46,129-38
329. Id. at 130.
330. Id. at 21-46, 129-38.
331. See Holmes, supra note 318.
332. Id. at 4-5.
333. Id. at 3.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 5-7.
336. Id. at 3.




of social advantage .... Propositions as to public policy rarely are
unanimously accepted.#.. ."339
While at the conceptual level, the debate on malicious torts was an
ambitious effort of analytical clarification, at the level of legal reasoning,
it was the laboratory where a new mode of policy analysis- anticipating
the relativist and pragmatic approach of Legal Realism-was developed.
The conceptual clarification of the problem of malice presented
American jurists with the task of modifying and attuning their reasoning
techniques.340 If, as Terry and Holmes suggested, the question of malice
was, essentially, the question of admitting exceptions to the general duty
to refrain from intentionally inflicting damage, and, if such question was
ultimately decided on the basis of considerations of policy, a new and
more sophisticated mode of policy analysis was to be developed. The
tools of classical legal science, including logical deduction and
rudimentary forms of policy analysis that we have seen deployed by the
courts, were to abandoned or refined. Terry, Holmes, Ames, and Lewis
were eager to denounce the failures of hollow deductive reasoning in
solving the question of malice. In Terry's words:
The real questions in Allen v. Flood . . . and in Quinn v.
Leathem .. . were of this kind. They are not questions about the nature
of malice or the general duty not to do malicious acts. Discussions of
these points simply obscure the true issue. They are questions of
admitting exceptions to the general duty. They are not to be decided by
deductions from legal theories about malice, and there are very few
precedents or established legal principles which will throw much light
upon them. They are really questions of the adjustment of the law to
new states of fact arising out the new and complicated conditions of
modern life.... [T]he decisions of the Courts upon them must and will
amount in reality to somewhat bold and extensive judicial legislation,
somewhat more bold and extensive than Courts nowadays like to
339. Id.
340. This organicist and policy-oriented mode of reasoning was proudly championed as a
peculiarly American trait, distinguishing American jurists and judges from their English counterparts.
In a 1910 article on the influence of social and economic ideals on the law of malicious torts, Gordon
Stoner effectively contrasted the social organicism of American judicial reasoning with the formalistic
approach of the English courts. See Gordon Stoner, Influence of Social and Economic Ideals on the
Law of Malicious Torts, 8 MICH. L. REV. 468 (19io). The questions raised by malice and abuse of rights
signal the need for a law organically reflecting evolving ethical, social, and economic ideals. Judges are
called to adjust the pace of legal change to that of social and economic evolution. American judges,
Stoner noted, were best equipped for this daunting task. Id. at 469. Quoting Justice Park in Mirehouse
v. Rennel, Stoner argued that English common lawyers aim at "uniformity, consistency and certainty."
Id. Their mode of reasoning consisted of the mechanical application of rules derived from judicial
precedents, and their ultimate goals were the rigor and coherence of legal science. Id. Justice Park's
words are contrasted with Justice Elliott's bold organicist act of faith in Tuttle v. Buck. See id. at 478.
(citing Tuttle v. Buck, 110 N.W. 946, 947 (Minn. 1909)). American courts. Stoner suggested. aimed to
adapt to social needs rather than uniformity and consistency. See id. 470. Their reasoning techniques




engage in, which must be based on broad considerations of justice and
policy, with little help from precedents or theory."'
The forms of balancing and policy analysis that we have seen
deployed by courts were to be further developed. When deciding the
question of justification, courts had, by and large, weighed conflicting
interests in light of multifactor standards of "malice" or
"reasonableness" reflecting notions of social morals or policy
considerations presented as "widely shared" and, hence, relatively
uncontroversial. To the contrary, Holmes pointed out that questions of
privilege and malice call for analytic choices among alternative
considerations of policy or justice.342 Judges are to balance, case by case,
weighing the actual and concrete gains and losses entailed by alternative
solutions. Balancing involves tracing the line in one place rather than in
another, and hence involves gains and losses that are the result of policy
preferences rather than of universal notions of justice or the public
good.343 Holmes was generous in examples:
Let us suppose another case of interference with business by an act
which has some special grounds of policy in its favor. Take the case of
advice not to employ a certain doctor, given by one in a position of
authority. To some extent it is desirable that people should be free to
give one another advice. On the other hand, commonly it is not
desirable that a man should lose his business. The two advantages run
against one another, and a line has to be drawn.... In such a case,
probably it would be said that if the advice was believed to be good,
and was given for the sake of benefiting the hearers, the defendant
would not be answerable. But if it was not believed to be for their
benefit, and was given for the sake of hurting the doctor, the doctor
would prevail."
The scholarly debate over malicious torts revealed the limits of
courts' reasoning tool kit and the need for a more sophisticated mode of
legal analysis. But the ultimate stake of the debate lay elsewhere. Jurists
and writers were quick to realize the implications of the question of
malice in the larger and incandescent context of industrial struggles.
Contrary to their continental European colleagues who discussed the
problem of abuse of rights at a rather abstract level, they did not shy
away from examining the problem of malice in light of the questions
posed by labor/capital disputes. Holmes's scheme of intentional tort
proved a critical weapon in labor cases. As his Vegelhan dissent shows,345
Holmes envisaged his theory of intentional tort as a crucial tool for
governing industrial warfare, furthering the cause of peaceful trade
341. Terry, supra note 303, at 26.
342. Holmes, supra note 3 18.
343. Duncan Kennedy & Marie Claire Belleau, Le place de Rend Dernogue dans la gdndalogie
depensde juridique conternporaine, 56 REVUE INTERDICIPLINAIRE D'ETUDES JURID3IQUES 163 (2oo6).
344. Holmes, supra note 318, at 6.
345. See 44 N.E. 1077, io8i (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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unionism. By focusing on motive, Holmes was able to expand the scope
of justification, exempting from liability peaceful labor activities.
In a lengthy and careful investigation of crucial issues in labor law
that appeared in 1907 in the Harvard Law Review, Jeremiah Smith
further explored the question of justification, attuning the scheme of
intentional tort to recent labor cases.' 6 Smith set forth four requisites for
the validity of "just cause or excuse" in labor cases: pertinence,
reasonable fitness, proportionality, and direct conduct.' First, "[t]here
must be a conflict of interest between plaintiff and defendant as to the
subject matter in regard to which the damage is done."" Second, "[t]he
damaging act must be reasonably calculated to substantially advance the
interest of the defendant."349 Third, the resulting damage must be
proportional to the benefit to the defendant.350 Fourth, "the justification
must be confined to those cases where [the] defendant uses only his own
conduct as a lever," rather than an outsider's conduct. 5 '
Upon closer inspection, Smith's fourfold guide to justification is a
restrictive approach to certain sophisticated forms of labor struggle, such
as secondary boycott, because the direct conduct requirement rules out
any labor activity that relies on a third party. While Smith notes that the
right to abstain from work is absolute, it cannot be used to induce a third
person to take action damaging to the plaintiff. Moreover, the reasonable
fitness and proportionality requirements exclude methods of warfare
dependent on inter-trade solidarity. Smith concedes that while workers
in one trade may take measures to strengthen unionism in their own
trade, they cannot do so to bolster unionism in another trade.352
Ultimately, the debate over malicious torts grew into a broader
clash over different models of socio-economic development and power
346. Jeremiah Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation I., 2o HARv. L. REV. 253 (19o7). It is
impossible to have any clear discussion of the crucial labor cases, he contended, unless "we either
discard certain ambiguous expressions altogether or distinctly indicate the meaning intended to be
affixed to them." Id. at 255. Seeking to bring clarity, he distinguished between "intent" and "motive":
the former describes the defendant's immediate intent, the latter denotes the defendant's ulterior
intent. Id. at 256-57. While intent is often material to the question of the defendant's liability, "the
cases where motive is material are comparatively rare." Id. at 259. Smith quotes Ames's articulation of
the doctrine of intentional tort as an accurate representation of the law: In Ames's words,
"The willful causing of damage to another by a positive act, whether by one man alone,
or by several acting in concert, and whether by direct action against him or indirectly by
inducing a third person to exercise a lawful right, is a tort unless there was cause for
inflicting the damage;-..."
Id. at 263 (alteration in original) (quoting Ames, supra note 72, at 412).
347. Smith, Crucial Issues II, supra note 131, at 361-62.
348. Id. at 361.
34Q. Id.
350. Id.
353. Id. at 361-62.
352. Id. at 362.
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relations among social actors. Gordon Stoner noted in 1909 that judicial
decisions and juristic conceptualizations in the area of malicious torts
reflect changes in the public opinion, registering variations in political,
economic, and ethics ideas." Stoner's survey of different lines of cases
involving business competition, boycotts, and closed shops evinced a
marked shift in thinking. Rather than focusing on individualistic thinking
committed to absolute rights and freedom of action, courts adopted a
social outlook that weighed individual rights against societal welfare.
Stoner was eager to denounce the asymmetry between courts' treatment
of malice in labor cases and cases involving business competition.354 In
the former, he suggested, judges, when determining liability, tend to
consider the immediate motive of the defendant (i.e., the immediate
result desired to be accomplished by the act), while disregarding the
ultimate motive (i.e., the result which the actor wishes to effect not by
the act itself but as part of a broader strategy).5
To illustrate, suppose a labor union, some of whose members are
employed by a manufacturer, who also employs non-union men, orders
him to discharge the non-union men and threatens to compel its men
to quit work if he does not comply with the order. To avoid a strike he
discharges the non-union men. Here the immediate result desired is the
injury-the discharge-of the non-union men. It may very well be that
the ultimate motive is to force all laborers to join the union and thus to
increase its power and usefulness. It may be stated as a general rule
that in labor cases the courts have not regarded the ultimate motive of
the defendants in determining their liability."'
On the other hand, Stoner argued, courts seem reluctant to adopt
the same principle in cases of business competition, when the interests of
big business are at stake:
Suppose this principle were to be applied in the same way in suits
brought by an independent company against a trust where the trust has
cut prices so as to lose money in the district where it competes with the
independent company, in order to drive the independent concern out
of business and so to destroy it or force it to enter the combination to
preserve itself. Here the immediate motive is the injury or destruction
of the plaintiff company, the ultimate motive, the benefit to be derived
by the trust through forcing the independent concern to unite with it or
go out of business."
So far, in similar cases, Stoner noted, judges have tended to adopt
an opposite principle, disregarding the immediate motive and focusing
on the ultimate motive."' While fear of an increase in labor power leads
353. Stoner, supra note 340, at 479.
354. Id. at 475-77.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 479-80.




courts to gloss over the defendant union's ultimate motive, an
individualistic commitment to freedom of action and the sacredness of
unrestrained competition has so far prompted them to deem the ultimate
motive of business competition a valid justification. A similar awareness
of the asymmetry is evidenced in Walter Wheeler Cook's analysis.
When the legality of attempts to close a market by economic pressure
on those who deal with rivals has been called in question ... the
tendency has been to regard the acts of the defendants as lawful; when
the legality of similar attempts to unionize a shop has been called in
question, the tendency has been to regard such attempts as illegal.5
On the contrary, advocates of unrestrained competition and "the
open market" denounced the power of labor unions as a threat to
individual morality, the independence of workers and employers, the
natural equilibrium of competition, and the principle of equality before
the law. Bruce Wyman's denunciation of courts' illiberal efforts to side
with labor in the mounting industrial warfare betrays disquiet. Even to
the most superficial observers of current events, he noted, it was clear
that the competitive system is threatened from many quarters." Courts'
treatment of unions' malicious competitive activity posed the greatest
danger to individual freedom and industrial liberty. The doctrine of the
closed shop was being surreptitiously established and the courts seemed
to be abdicating their task of "protecting the freedom of the individual
against the oppression of the combination." 361 Unionizing and boycotting,
Wyman claimed, pose a despotic and tyrannical threat to individual
liberty, their efficacy resting on the overpowering force of numbers.362
Not only is strengthening the power of labor a menace to individual
freedom, it is also prejudicial to the larger interest of society. While the
public wants the best services for the lowest wages, unionizing means less
efficient services and increasing wages. In a crescendo of anxiety, Wyman
warned that the end of the open market and the disturbance of the
competitive system would be "the final catastrophe beyond which there
could be nothing but the horror of anarchy or the hopelessness of
socialism. "363
CONCLUSION
The story of abuse of rights in the United States speaks to
contemporary private lawyers called to rethink the nature and role of
private law in the era of postnational sovereignty and the crisis of social
359. Wm. Draper Lewis, The Closed Market, the Union Shop, and the Common Law, 18 HARv. L.
REV. 444,447 (1905).
360. Bruce Wyman, The Maintenance of the Open Shop. 17 GREEN BAG 21. 21 (1905).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 25.
363. Wyman, supra note 21, at 221.
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democracy. Comparative law's potential as a tool for large-scale legal
reform has been the object of dispute in recent decades. Some have
argued that comparative law may have a constraining effect, reinforcing
legal professionals' "fetishism of the actual." The existing variations
among the legal institutions of Western capitalist democracies, they
suggest, represent only a subset of a larger inventory of unrealized
possibilities. 6 4 Others have envisioned comparative legal analysis as a
trigger for institutional imagination, providing radical reformers with a
repertoire of alternative legal/institutional arrangements that have
proven effective under real life conditions. 6 ' This Article suggests that
comparative law may help foster private lawyers' imagination by casting
light on the potentialities and limits of the revival of abuse of rights as a
tool for redressing distributive inequalities.
The examination of American nineteenth-century abuse of rights
theories and cases, I believe, provides contemporary reformers with two
cautionary tales. First, it may fall short of rectifying the market-oriented
language of European private law. In its nineteenth-century life, abuse of
rights hardly challenged the individualistic premises of modern private
law, leaving largely intact the language of free will, individual autonomy,
and absolute property. Similarly, today, abuse of rights may delude those
who advocate a new social lexicon for private law.
Second, abuse of rights may fail to deliver progressive distributive
outcomes. In the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, American cases
show that abuse of rights resulted in highly diverse and ambiguous
outcomes, and only occasionally redressed distributive asymmetries.
Abuse of rights' ambiguity as a "social corrective" raises broader
questions as to the nature and the structure of contemporary private law.
Over the course of the last two centuries, private law has evolved to
reflect, facilitate, and legitimate changes in Western societies' economic,
political, and ideological structure. The legal fabric of the new order
established by the French Revolution and the modern bourgeoisie,
"classical" nineteenth-century private law consisted of an essential
framework meant to organize and police the free interaction between
autonomous individuals. In the late-nineteenth century and early-
twentieth century, the structure of "classical" private law was altered to
accommodate the development of industrial society and to reflect the
social-democratic compromise. Called to simultaneously ensure market
efficiency and nonexploitative distributive outcomes, private law was re-
organized according to a binary structure "rights/will + corrective."
Abuse of rights, good faith, unconscionability, and the labor contract
364. See, e.g., UNGER, supra note 10.
365. Cf Waidron, supra note so, at 510 (finding "unconvincing Unger's description of the way
legal analysis can become a catalyst for change of the institutional imagination of society").
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were conceived as "correctives" allowing the effective enjoyment of
rights and mitigating the most blatant distributive inequalities.
Faced with new challenges, contemporary private lawyers
interrogate the enduring desirability of the binary structure "rights/will +
corrective." In Europe, while market liberals advocate the "un-making"
of private 6 , (i.e., the rolling back of social correctives), progressives
invoke "flex-security" and call for setting up "social correctives" at the
supra-national level. The most promising avenue, however, might be that
indicated by a growing strand of "experimentalist" private law
scholarship.3 8 A "freedom-promoting" private law, capable of expanding
the set of viable options an individual faces and of redressing distributive
asymmetries, might look very different from binary twentieth-century
private law. Rather than "limiting" and "correcting" rights,
experimentalist private lawyers direct attention to the need for recasting
rights, expanding the domain of resources subject to rights, and devising
new criteria of ownership.'6
366. The "un-making" of private law is described by Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The
Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. I (2004).
367. On the developments of twentieth-century private law, see Daniela Caruso, Private Law and
State-Making in the Age of Globalization, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (2oo6); Daniela Caruso, The
Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 EuR. L.J. 3
(1997); Christian Joerges, The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist
Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective 3 EUR. L.J. 378 (1997); Peer
Zumbansen, Semantics of European Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 114 (1999): and Peer Zumbansen, The Law of
Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 191 (2007).
368. See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information,
52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003); James Boyle, The New Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003): Jedediah Purdy. A Freedom-Promoting
Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. Cm. L. REV. 1237 (2005); UNGER,
supra note xo.
369. Purdy, supra note 368, at 1238 41.
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